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Thesis title: 'Caspian gas supplies: an opportunity of EU energy diversification?'  
 
Hypothesis 
Efforts to diversify European energy security by securing supplies from the Caspian 
Region via TCP and Nabucco pipelines will have minimal impact 
 
Research question:  
Central to this research is the need to answer the question, whether or not realization 
Nabucco and Trans-Caspian pipeline projects will lower dependency of Europe on Russian 
gas supplies and ensure EU's energy security? 
 
Objectives 
 briefly analyze European energy market and dynamics of its growing dependency 
on Russian gas supplies 
 identify the motives behind Europe’s effort to seek alternative gas supplier 
 identify mechanisms of the EU aimed at gaining access to Caspian energy 
 make an overview and compare energy export abilities of Russia and other 
Caspian region countries 
 estimate possibilities of realization of pipeline projects (TCGP and Nabucco) to 
supply Caspian energy to Europe bypassing Russia 
 determine the contribution of Caspian gas supplies to the EU energy security 
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Methodology 
Comparative analysis is applied to compare natural gas export abilities, current/future 
gas production levels of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia. 
The analysis is based on World Energy Outlook 2008 and BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy 2009.  
Case study analysis is applied to determine what share of European gas consumption can 
be satisfied with Caspian energy supplies in case of Nabucco and TCGP realization 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
Contemporary life is barely imaginable without two main sources of energy – oil and 
gas. Safety and accessibility of energy supplies is crucial not only for everyday life but also 
for the sustainable development and technological progress of any nation.  Throughout the 
20
th
 century, energy factor has become a turning point in global politics and interstate 
relations.  Today, accessibility of energy supplies is essential for country's national security 
and economic stability.
1
 
Random distribution of energy sources throughout the world causes reliance of 
majority of countries on foreign deliveries.
2
 Competition among main energy consumers to 
establish control over oil and gas production and transportation reflects on their foreign policy. 
Depletion of non-renewable energy sources, growing demand for energy, rising prices on oil 
and gas make this competition even tougher.
3
 Uneven distribution of energy sources gives 
economic and political power to those countries which have an access to oil and gas reserves. 
Unstable oil and gas supplies and changing prices on energy sources challenge domestic 
security, especially in OECD countries.
4
 
The appearance of new independent Caspian bordering states after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union attracted attention of global powers for the reason that the region was 
potentially rich with crude oil and natural gas. However, by the 1990s the producing potential 
of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan was not yet estimated, it took on 
                                                 
1
 Amineh, Mehdi (2004): “Caspian Energy: A viable alternative to the Persian Gulf?” EurAsia Bulletin, Vol. 8 
No. 3-4, on March-April, 2004 http://www.eias.org/publications/bulletin/2004/marapr04/ebmarapr04p6.pdf 
(03.03.2010) 
2
 Abishev, A. (2004): Kaspij: neft' I politika. Kazachstanskij Institut Svobodnoje Obščestvo, Astana 
3
 Amineh (2004) 
4
 http://www.globalissues.org/article/595/energy-security (23.03.2010) 
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enormous significance for global powers. The Caspian region which has been under Iranian 
and Russian control for centuries, - became an object of competition among countries and 
international corporations. 
The undeveloped oil and gas fields of the Caspian region attracted attention of the 
Western countries in their quest to reduce dependence on energy sources of the Middle East. 
Asia's dynamic economies, India and China, were also looking for additional oil and gas 
suppliers because of their growing demand in energy sources. As for Russia, it still had strong 
economic ties and a common pipeline system with its post-Soviet neighbors; therefore 
Russia's influence on oil and gas flows from the Caspian bordering states was unavoidable. 
Almost two decades passed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and it is now clear 
that the potential of the region is far less than those of the Persian Gulf, but competition 
among the great powers is still ongoing. Most of the Caspian oil and gas reach global markets 
through Russian territory, and Moscow's efforts to secure its control over Caspian energy are 
yet successful. Russia seeks to preserve its influence over Caspian pipeline system, supports 
an increase in volumes of supplied resources, and signs long-term supply contracts with every 
country of this region.
5
 
To date, Caspian region countries supply their energy resources not only to Russia. 
Two pipelines bypassing Russia to deliver Caspian energy to European market were created: 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and South Caucasus gas pipeline. Besides that, Central 
Asian countries supply their energy sources to China and Iran via direct pipelines. 
Over the past 20 years dependence of Europe on energy supplies from Russia and the 
Middle East has substantially grown, which is associated with its increased oil and gas 
consumption and decline in energy production of the North Sea.
6
 Reliance of Europe on 
                                                 
5
 Baran, Zeyno (2007): “EU Energy Security: Time to End Russian leverage” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 30, 
on September 2007, pp. 131 - 144 http://www.twq.com/07autumn/docs/07autumn_baran.pdf (12.02.2010) 
6
 Cornell, Svante and Nilsson, Niklas (2008): The Nabucco Pipeline: Reemerging Momentum in Europe‟s Front 
Yard. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, Washington 
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foreign suppliers and lack of coherence among the EU member-states concerning energy 
security is fraught with emergence of economic, political, ecological and other threats to 
European energy security. It is predicted that by 2020 the European Union “will need to 
import up to 75 percent of its natural gas requirements and two-thirds of its total energy 
requirements”.7 
Russia is currently the major importer of natural gas to the EU, but there are plenty of 
economic and political risks associated with growing dependence of Europe on Russian gas 
supplies. To avert the potential risks, Europe is seeking to diversify its energy suppliers, and 
the Caspian region is seen as “the most obvious candidate to serve as a new and relatively 
untapped source of natural gas and oil for Europe”.8 Backing construction of direct pipelines 
from the Caspian region, Europe strives to strengthen its energy security. 
 
1. 2. Research Focus 
Europe faces some challenges in its quest to acquire Caspian energy, including 
remoteness of the Caspian oil and gas fields from European markets, strong economic, 
historical and cultural ties between Russia and post-Soviet Caspian littoral states, growing 
influence of China in the region, and the region's political instability. It is therefore unclear to 
what extent supplies from the Caspian region can or cannot guarantee energy security to the 
European Union. 
Caspian Sea is surrounded by five countries: Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan and Russia. Uzbekistan is often mentioned as a part of the “Caspian block”.9 The 
study will focus on four post-Soviet republics of Central Asia and Caucasus: Kazakhstan, 
                                                 
7
 Olcott, Marta Brill (2008): “Security for a New Century: Study Group Report”, The Henry L. Stimson Center  
http://www.stimson.org/newcentury/pdf/02.01.08%20Martha%20Brill%20Olcott-
%20Central%20Asian%20Energy.pdf (26.02.2010) 
8
 Cornell, Nilsson (2008) 
9
 Belopsky, Andrei V. and Talwin, Manik (2002) “Geopolitical Basins and Oil and Gas Reserves of the Greater 
Caspian Region”, in: Kalyuzhnova, Y., Jaffe, A.M., Lynch D. and Sickles R.C. (eds.) Energy in the Caspian 
Region, Palgrave Macmillian, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, pp. 13-33  
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Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, because of similar political processes and 
historical roots of these countries. Due to some political reasons Europe is more interested in 
oil and gas supplies from these four countries rather than from Iran and Russia. European 
authorities believe that these post-Soviet republics are of particular interest to the EU, 
inasmuch as supplies of hydrocarbons from the region would improve energy security of the 
European Union. 
The question on whether or not Caspian region can become an alternative gas supplier 
to the European Union is in the limelight of many policymakers and scholars. Opinions on 
this issue are diverse. While some scholars advance a view that “the considerable oil and gas 
resources in the Caspian region, primarily in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, 
constitute the most accessible alternative energy supplies for Europe”.10 Others argue that due 
to political and economic risks, energy supplies from the Caspian region are “not pivotal to 
EU energy strategy”11 and “the amount of gas that could potentially flow from Central Asia 
to Europe is not enough to change the paradigm of Europe’s energy relationship with 
Russia”.12 
The issue of energy security is critical for the European Union. The state of insecurity 
can cause various negative consequences, e.g. a halt in gas and oil supplies, or sudden price 
increase on energy resources.
13
 Transportation of gas from one country to another can be 
carried out via pipeline routes, or in the liquefied form (LNG), while there are more options 
for oil deliveries: pipelines, railroads, tankers. Transportation of liquefied natural gas is not 
yet widespread in Europe, which makes the European Union dependent on pipeline supplies. 
Finding new gas suppliers is a thorny issue for the European Union, because there are ffewer 
                                                 
10
 Cornell, Nilsson (2008) 
11
 Denison, Michael (2009): “The EU and Central Asia Commercialising the Energy Relationship” EUCAM 
Working Paper No. 2, on July 2009 http://www.fride.org/publication/637/the-eu-and-central-asia:-
commercialising-the-energy-relationship (18.03.2010) 
12
 Crisis Group (2007): Central Asia‟s Energy Risks, Asia Report N°133, on 24 May 2007 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/central-asia/133_central_asia_s_energy_risks.ashx (01.03.2010) 
13
 Baran (2007) 
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options for gas supplies diversification, and gas is traded by long-term contracts.
14
 It is 
therefore of particular importance for Europe to estimate the challenges it has to face with 
new potential suppliers of natural gas. 
As Caspian region is considered an alternative gas supplier, a pipeline system to 
deliver Caspian gas to Europe should be created. Currently, Caspian gas is delivered to the 
European markets predominantly through the territory of Russia, resulting increased 
dependence of the EU on a single supplier. However, two pipeline projects bypassing Russia 
could reverse this trend: Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) and Nabucco. Realization or 
failure of the projects will play a decisive role in determining the Caspian region as a possible 
gas supplier. The obstacles to put these pipelines into operation include their costliness, 
involvement of too many countries, the ambiguous position of some countries on their 
participation in the projects, the doubts about abilities of Caspian countries to fill the pipelines. 
As assured by President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso, "The 
Nabucco project is of crucial importance for Europe's energy security and its policy of 
diversification of gas supplies and transport routes.”15. However, Russian policymakers don't 
share the view, for instance, Konstantin Simonov, director of the independent National Energy 
Security Fund in Moscow, argues that Nabucco “will not reduce Europe's reliance on Russian 
gas... because the pipeline's capacity will be too low and the continent's own gas production 
is declining.”16 
A major focus of this research will concentrate on the debate amongst policymakers 
and scholars on whether or not realization of the Nabucco and Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline 
(TCGP) projects can lower the dependency of the European Union on Russian gas supplies 
and ensure EU's energy security. Statistics overview will feed the arguments with factual 
                                                 
14
 Cornell, Nilsson (2008) 
15
 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1114&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN 
(24.03.2010) 
16
http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-07-14-voa32-68804462.html (10.02.2010) 
13 
 
evidences of various viewpoints. 
 
1.3. Overall Research Aim and Individual Research Objectives 
The overall research aim of the research is to advance an understanding of the impact 
of Caspian gas to European energy security. In order to understand why the European Union 
considers energy sources of the Caspian bordering states to be reliable suppliers, it is 
necessary to gain an insight into the forces motivating Europe to set a course for 
diversification. Given the confusion between those who predict that successful 
implementation of TCGP and Nabucco projects would guarantee better energy security for 
Europe and those who has doubts that construction of an energy bridge over the Caspian Sea 
can ever come to reality, it is important to clarify drivers and barriers of this issue. 
Three main vehicles will be exploited to implement this research: literature review, 
comparative analysis and case study analysis. The literature review will be focused on the 
controversy among scholars on three questions: 1. whether Caspian region countries produce 
sufficient amounts of natural gas to be supplied to Europe; 2. whether gas supplies from the 
region can contribute to improvement of European energy security, and 3. whether the 
realization of pipeline corridor connecting Caspian region and European Union is possible.  
Comparative analysis is applied in the study in order to determine whether gas 
supplies from the four Caspian countries can undermine Russia‟s dominance in European 
energy markets. Case study represents analysis of the proposed Southern Corridor consisting 
of Trans-Caspian, South Caucasus and Nabucco pipelines in order to estimate the ability of 
Caspian countries to contribute to the improvement of European energy security. 
Specifically, the objectives of this research are to: 
1. analyze European energy market and dynamics of its growing dependency on 
Russian gas supplies, 
14 
 
2. identify the motives behind Europe‟s effort to seek alternative gas supplier, 
3. evaluate the ability of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to 
meet European energy needs, 
4. analyze the impact of the TCGP and Nabucco pipeline projects to the European 
energy security in case of their implementation, 
and 
5. estimate the possibilities of participation of Caspian countries in the pipeline 
projects which aim to supply Caspian energy to Europe bypassing Russia. 
 
1.4 Value of the Present Research 
As said, energy security is an issue of particular significance, especially for the 
European Union. Energy trade is closely linked with politics, and lack of critical investigation 
in this area can result in wrong political decisions and economic losses. It is important to 
make a research of energy markets, political climate and possible risks to examine whether 
pipeline construction can or cannot provide energy security to the EU. 
The value of this research lies mainly in its many-sidedness. It provides diverse views 
of scholars and politicians on the issues related to European growing dependence on foreign 
(primarily Russian) gas supplies. It should be disclosed why Europe is looking for new 
alternative suppliers as a means to strengthen its energy security. The research represents 
motives of Europe's interests in the Caspian region, and case study analysis helps to estimate 
the capability of the proposed projects to contribute to European energy security. There is a 
call for practical research in the field of energy due to the fact that energy security is a burning 
issue not only for the European Union, but also for other energy consuming and energy 
producing regions and countries. 
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II. EUROPEAN ENERGY SECURITY: A NEED FOR DIVERSIFICATION 
 
2.1. Energy Security: Theoretical Approach 
Modern life is hardly imaginable without sustainable access to energy, because it 
affects almost every sphere of human activity. Inadequate or interrupted access to energy can 
undermine transportation, communication, industrial development and is fraught with 
violations of economic balance. Energy security has become a component of national security, 
and today it is important for any society to ensure timely deliveries of energy and to prevent 
supply disruptions.
17
 
According to International Energy Agency, Energy Security can be described as 
“uninterrupted physical availability at a price which is affordable, while respecting 
environment concerns”.18 There are two types of energy security: long-term energy security 
stands for timely supplies of energy sources to satisfy country's economic needs, while short-
term energy security refers to the ability of a country to take necessary measures when sudden 
changes in supply or demand of energy sources occur.
19
 
Spanjer divides energy security into two groups: “System security – the extent, to 
which consumers can be guaranteed, within foreseeable circumstances, of gas supply – and 
quantity security – guaranteeing an adequate supply of gas now as well as in the future.” The 
later includes volumes of gas, gas supply diversification and price control.
20
 
Various sources of energy can result in various threats that can damage the state of 
energy security. According to Stern, major risks to energy security are related to long-term 
availability of energy supplies which comprises 'adequacy of supply and the infrastructure for 
                                                 
17
 Bahgat, G. (2009) “Europe‟s Energy Security: Challenges and Opportunities” in: Bradley A. Thayer and Nuray 
Ibryamova (eds.): Debates in International Relations. Pearson Longman Publishers, London 
http://www.cuimpb.es/uploads/ponencias/386Sessio_VI.pdf (12.02.2010) 
18
 http://www.iea.org/subjectqueries/keyresult.asp?KEYWORD_ID=4103 (3.03.2010) 
19
 International energy agency http://www.iea.org/subjectqueries/keyresult.asp?KEYWORD_ID=4103 
20Spanjer, A.R. (2007): “Russian gas price reform and the EU-Russia gas relationship: Incentives, consequences 
and European security of supply”, Energy Policy, 35(5), May, p. 2889-2898 
http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/as-2007-1.pdf 
16 
 
delivering this supply to markets'. Also, in order to prevent supply failures, strategic security 
should be ensured.
21
 
There can be several reasons of energy supply disruptions, including natural (e.g. 
hurricanes in Gulf of Mexico), political and social (for instance conflicts in Latin America, 
Iran's nuclear program, Iraq's terrorist activities).
22
 Economic reasons to affect energy security 
include price changes on energy, efforts of investment to the energy sector in a given country, 
changes in demand and supply dynamics in particular regions and countries, etc. 
23
  
Random distribution of oil and gas results in growing competition for energy sources. 
Hydrocarbon reserves are concentrated in certain countries and regions, mainly in West Africa, 
Persian Gulf, and Russia while the demand for oil and gas is growing most drastically in 
China, Japan, USA, and the EU.
24
 Energy consumption in China and India, the two fastest-
growing economies, is increasing tremendously. Today, there is no confidence in secure 
supplies from the owner of largest energy reserves, - Persian Gulf, - because of the unstable 
political situation in Iraq and the Iranian nuclear program. Due to these reasons, global 
competition for control over energy sources is becoming even tougher, and as a consequence 
energy prices are increasing.
25
 
To ensure energy security the energy system should be able to prevent disruptions of 
energy supplies as far as it is possible. This can be done via diversification of suppliers to 
prevent overdependence of one country or region on single energy supplier, and via 
diversification of energy sources and energy-mix.
26
 
 
                                                 
21
 Stern, J.P. (2002): Security of European Natural Gas Supplies: The impact of import dependence and 
liberalization. Royal Institute of International Affairs, London 
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/3035_sec_of_euro_gas_jul02.pdf (27.03.2010) 
22
 http://www.weforum.org/pdf/EnergyVisionSummary.pdf (1.03.2010) 
23
 Bahgat (2009)  
24
 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2009  
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=98&contentId=7010497 (18.02.2010) 
25
 Bahgat (2009) 
26
 Ibid 
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2.2. Energy Security of the European Union 
Being the second biggest energy consumer in the world, the European Union is weak 
in regard to ensuring its energy security. The major problem is declination of indigenous 
energy production throughout Europe, and growing dependency on external energy suppliers. 
Oil, gas, coal, and renewables are the four most commonly used energy sources in 
Europe. Coal consumption is decreasing, because of high levels of pollution it produces. After 
the accident in Chernobyl in 1986 usage of nuclear power was considered to be unsafe and 
number of nuclear plants was closed. The use of biofuels, wind, hydro energy, and solar 
power are widely used in Sweden, Latvia, Finland, Portugal, and Austria, but in other 
European countries the renewable energy sources are not popular.  In 2006, consumption of 
renewable energy sources in the EU was about 9.2% only. Hydrocarbons are leading the 
current European energy-mix, and as predicted this trend will remain for the next decades, 
despite the attempts are made to replace them with alternative sources.
27
   
Primary demand for oil and gas in Europe is growing, while EU indigenous production 
of hydrocarbons is diminishing with each passing year. For instance, from 1998 to 2008 gas 
production of the EU-27 decreased by 14.8%, while gas consumption increased by 18.3%. 
This means that over ten years EU dependency on imported gas has grown from 46% in 1998 
to 61% in 2008.
28
 As predicted, imports of EU gas consumption are expected to rise to some 
70% in 2030, in the case of oil products to 90%.
29
 
                                                 
27
 http://energy.eu/ (21.03.2010) 
28
 BP 2009 
29
 European Commission Green Paper (2002): “Energy: Let Us Overcome Our Dependence”. Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg 
http://www.clubofamsterdam.nl/contentarticles/12%20energy/eu%20green%20paper.pdf (2.02.2010) 
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Figure 1: EU natural gas production and consumption, Source: BP, 2009 
Figure 2: Natural gas supply reference scenario: EU-30, Outlook for European Gas Demand, Supply 
and Investment to 2030, Source: IEA, 2003 
 
The EU member states possess only about 1.6% of world proved gas reserves and 0.5% 
of oil reserves,
30
 which is not enough to satisfy all energy needs of the European Union. 
Therefore, the EU has to seek for external energy suppliers. Oil and gas are imported to 
Europe predominantly from the Persian Gulf, North Africa and Russia. Currently, oil is the 
dominant fuel for Europeans, while consumption of gas is growing most rapidly. Natural gas 
is less harmful for the environment than oil and coal are, but transportation of this source of 
energy is more complicated. Gas is imported to Europe predominantly via pipelines from 
Russia, Algeria and Norway.
31
 
                                                 
30
 BP 2009 
31
 EU Commission Green Paper (2006): “A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy” 
Brussels http://www.energy.eu/directives/2006_03_08_gp_document_en.pdf (2.02.2010) 
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2.3. EU-Russia Energy Relations 
Russia is among the largest producers of oil and gas, holding 79 billion barrels of oil 
and 43.3 trillion cubic meters of gas,
32
 and is a key supplier of energy sources to the European 
Union. Statistics show that European dependence on Russian energy supplies, especially on 
Russian gas exports will grow in the future. For instance, in 2006, the EU imported almost 
half of its natural gas and 30 percent of its oil from Russia.
33
 By 2030 EU's dependence on 
Russian natural gas imports could rise to about 50%. 
However, the EU fears the perspective of predominance of Russian gas supplies in 
European energy market. For a more profound understanding of these concerns, let us go to 
history of energy relations between Russia and the European Union. 
During the Soviet era, most of Russia's oil and gas were supplied to its Eastern allies. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia had no financial resources to develop its energy 
sector while possessing huge oil and gas fields. Meanwhile, Europe's energy consumption and 
its need for additional energy suppliers were growing.
34
 
Current oil pipeline system which connects Russian oilfields with Europe consists of 
Druzhba Pipeline, the Baltic Pipeline System, and the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. The 
largest oil route, Druzhba, is divided into two sections: Northern Druzhba which goes through 
Belarus to Poland and Germany, and Southern Druzhba which supplies Russian oil to Eastern 
Europe and Balkans. Caspian Pipeline Consortium transports Central Asian oil to Russian 
port Novorossiysk, from which Russian oil can be shipped to Western markets through the 
Black sea.
35
 
Natural gas is transported to Europe from Russia via Yamal-Europe, Blue Stream, 
Soyuz and Druzhba pipelines. Europe's dependence on Russian gas is greater than on Russian 
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oil. This trend, according to several scholars and politicians, can undermine its energy security 
due to number of economic and political reasons.
36
 First, it is doubtful whether Russia will be 
able to expand its producing capacity and meet growing needs of the European Union. 
Secondly, Russian gas sector is under control of the government, and is therefore not 
regulated by market rules. This сan complicate Russian-European energy relations and create 
a possibility for Russia to use energy as a political tool. 
The main problem concerning the supply of Russian gas to Europe lies in the fact that 
existing pipelines pass through borders of transit countries. The fact that Russian gas reaches 
the European Union through territories of Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova makes the EU 
dependent not only on Russia as energy supplier, but also on the bilateral relations between 
Russia and the transit countries.  Favorable relations between Russia and Ukraine are of 
particular importance, as about 80% of Russian gas goes to Europe through territory of 
Ukraine.
37
 The 2006 and 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas disputes have demonstrated, how dire the 
consequences of EU's overdependence on Russia as a dominate energy supplier can be for the 
European Union, and showed to what extent the European energy security can suffer from 
deterioration of bilateral relations between Russia and transit countries. 
Uneasy relations between Russia and Ukraine over gas problems have developed as 
early as the 1990s. This was caused by economic recession and high interdependence between 
the two countries on gas issues. Large debts of Ukraine to Russia, unprofitable prices on 
Russian gas for Ukraine, bad facilities for gas transportation, and stealing of transit gas by 
Ukraine resulted in periodic suspensions of gas supplies throughout the 1990s. The situation 
was more or less resolved with the restoration of the economies of the two states in early 
2000s.
3839
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In 2004 Gazprom and Naftogaz agreed on prices and volumes of gas supplies, but 
energy relations between Russia and Ukraine were deteriorated again the following year. The 
new Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko refused the arrangements reached in 2004, in 
particular those concerning the transfer of Ukrainian gas transportation and storage assets into 
the Gazprom's ownership. Besides that, views of Russian government and the Yushchenko's 
administration differed on several issues regarding the functioning of Russian-Ukrainian 
consortium RosUkrEnergo.
40
 
Since 2005, Gazprom switched its pricing policy towards ex-Soviet countries in 
accordance with “free market rules”. This meant that subsidies to the CIS countries were no 
longer provided and gas prices were increased to the level of Western European energy 
consumers from January, 2006.
41
 The fact is that Russia has pursued dual pricing policy in 
respect of various countries of Europe, CIS and domestic usage since 1990s. For instance, gas 
prices for the EU countries in 2003 were six times more expensive than domestic prices.
42
 
This system was created in order to boost production and stimulate domestic gas use while 
attracting European capital for the development of the Russian economy.  
In July, 2005 the Russian Duma voted to raise gas prices to a number of post-Soviet 
countries: Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Meanwhile, pricing 
policy towards Belarus remained unchanged at that time.
43
 
Ukraine's disagreement to pay more than four-fold increased price of $230 per 1,000 
cubic meters (instead of $50) was followed with the cut of gas supplies to this country on 
January 1
st
, 2006. Transit gas supplies to Europe through Ukrainian territory continued. 
Nevertheless, Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute affected the EU as well, as reductions in gas 
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supplies were observed in Hungary, Austria, Slovakia, Romania, France, Italy, and Germany.
44
 
Gazprom accused Ukraine of stealing 104.8 million cubic meters of gas which should 
have been transported to Europe via transit pipelines. In contrast, Ukrainian side claimed that 
it was Russia who decreased gas deliveries to Europe. Finally, gas supplies to Europe were 
reestablished on January 4
th
, as the sides came to a mutual agreement, according to which gas 
price was lowered for Ukraine to $95/mcm.
45
 However, the short-term agreement established 
the fixed price till June 2006 only, leaving the problem unsolved in the long-term context.
46
 
Ukrainian authorities saw political implications in Russian gas sanctions, because the 
incumbent President and one of the leaders of Ukrainian Orange Revolution Viktor 
Yushchenko pursued the policy of rapprochement with the West.
47
 In fact, increased price of 
$230/mcm for Ukraine was substantially higher than prices for other CIS countries. For 
instance, Russia raised prices for Moldova up to $160/mcm, for Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan up to $110/mcm, while for Belarus, which took pro-Russian policy, the price 
remained $46.7/mcm. As suggested by Stern, “had President Yushchenko not won the 2004-
05 elections, then relations between the two countries would not have deteriorated to the 
same extent, and a price accommodation between Gazprom and Naftogaz would probably 
have been reached... Had Ukraine chosen to maintain a closer political relationship with 
Russia, there is no doubt that it could have continued to pay lower gas prices at least for a 
period of time.”48 
Russia's actions towards Ukraine were considered by Europe as an attempt to use 
energy as a political leverage.
49
 Regardless of which party was guilty in the crisis, it was clear, 
that repetition of such situation in the future is possible. Despite the fact that the crisis lasted 4 
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days and complete cessation of gas supply to Europe has not occurred, this dispute 
undermined confidence of the European Union in stable gas supplies from Russia through 
Ukraine. 
Another gas dispute occurred in 2007 between Russia and Belarus, when Russia 
doubled its gas price to Belarus to $100/mcm. Both countries agreed that Belarus can pay 55% 
of the price during the first half of the year, but the remaining debt should be repaid by July, 
2007. However, Alexander Lukashenko, the president of Belarus, violated his obligation, 
which was followed by Russia's threats to cut energy supplies to Belarus. Finally, energy 
disruption did not occur, as Belarus managed to pay the whole price by August 8th.
5051
 
The 2009 gas dispute carried a much more profound implication for the European 
Union than the previous crises. On January 1
st
, Russia again halted gas deliveries to Ukraine 
because previous contract on gas supplies expired in December, 2008 and the parties couldn't 
come to an agreement on new pricing. Russia put into operation the Early Warning 
Mechanism, warning the European Union about the future possible disruptions. However, 
nothing was said about the volumes of gas reduced and about the possibility of complete 
cessation.
52
 
On January 2
nd
, several countries of Central and Eastern Europe felt partial reductions 
of gas supplies. On 6
th
 of January number of countries affected with the crisis has increased: 
volumes of gas supplies fell substantially in 16 EU member-states
53
. From 7
th
 to 20
th
 of 
January, supplies to Europe through Ukrainian territory were completely cut off. 
Representatives of Russia, Ukraine and the EU participated in gas dispute resolving, and on 
January 18
th
 a political agreement was achieved. On January 19
th 
a ten-year agreement was 
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signed by Gazprom and Naftogaz on terms of transition of Russian gas through Ukrainian 
territory.
54
 
Thirteen-day cessation of gas flows from Russia in 2009 affected most of the EU 
member-states indirectly or directly. However, Europe could not actively participate in 
solving of the bilateral crisis between Russia and Ukraine. There was basically no legal basis 
for Russia to continue gas supplies through Ukrainian territory.
55
 Thus, the 2009 crisis once 
again demonstrated the vulnerability of European energy security and inability of the EU to 
secure timely supplies of energy sources from its main gas importer. 
 
2.4. Measures to Enhance European Energy Security 
Recurring energy crises, rising demand for energy, rising prices on fossil fuels, and the 
prospect that Europe's dependence on external energy suppliers will increase in the future 
prompted the European Union to rethink its energy policy and take measures towards 
ensuring the EU energy security strategy. Realizing the fact of its vulnerability on energy 
issues, the Europe Union is seeking to enhance its energy security. The EU strategies and 
action plans proposed the following measures in order to address the problem
565758
:  
o to achieve cooperation and coherence among the EU member-states on Energy 
issues; 
o to increase the share of indigenous energy consumption; 
o to diversify EU energy-mix and increase consumption of renewable energy 
sources; 
o to improve access to LNG (liquefied natural gas) throughout the European 
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Union; 
o to improve investment  efficiency in European energy sector; 
o to prevent possible negative consequences of sudden supply disruptions, to 
improve early warning mechanisms; 
o to cooperate with major oil and gas producers in order to diversify energy 
importers and prevent overdependence of the EU on a single energy supplier. 
However, not all of the measures can serve enhancement of European energy security 
in both short-term and long-term perspectives. The preventative measures and mechanisms of 
early warning are able to provide short-term energy security for the European Union, while 
they can be helpless in case if energy disruptions drag on. The European Union aims to 
increase renewable energy consumption up to 20% by 2020.
59
  Also, Europe's interest in 
nuclear energy for electricity generation is growing with development of technologies and 
safety measures.  However, neither renewable nor nuclear energy are able to become 
sufficient enough to meet European energy demand and replace hydrocarbon sources for the 
next decade.
60
 This means that dependence of the European Union on external energy supplier 
will keep on growing in the foreseeable future. 
Therefore, diversification of energy suppliers is seen as the most reliable option to 
enhance energy security of the European Union. This measure would positively serve Europe, 
as competition of different oil and gas companies for European energy market would create 
more efficient price on energy and motivate the suppliers to provide better conditions for 
energy deliveries. 
There are two options of energy diversification for Europe: 1. diversification of 
Russian energy routes, and 2. enhancement of energy relations with other oil and gas 
producing regions and countries. The first option is strongly supported by Russian side, as 
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Moscow claims that if a new pipeline system bypassing transit countries of Belarus, Moldova 
and especially Ukraine is created, it would provide Europe with secure and stable energy 
supplies.
61
 The two alternative roots South Stream through the Black Sea to Bulgaria and 
Nord Stream under the Baltic Sea to Germany can facilitate reduction of European 
dependence on Russian-Ukrainian disputes. The South Stream pipeline which bypasses both 
Turkey and Ukraine is assumed to transport Russian gas to Bulgaria and further Europe and 
thus meet the needs of Central Europe, Balkans and Italy.
62
 Both pipelines would deliver 
Russian gas directly to Europe, and therefore contribute to the improvement of European 
energy security.
6364
 
On the other hand, the diversification process will not change the fact of Europe's 
dependence on Russian gas.  Gazprom's dominance over Russian gas sector creates obstacles 
for fare market conditions of energy supplies. The EU dependence on Russian gas creates 
number of risks for European energy security, including transit dependence, facility 
dependence and source dependence.
65
 
 Therefore, the European Union gives its priority to diversification of energy suppliers; 
increase the use of energy-mix and liquified natural gas rather than to creation of new oil and 
gas pipelines from Russia.66 As mentioned above, renewables and nuclear energy will not be 
able to satisfy European energy demand in the nearest future, and that is why creation of new 
pipelines bypassing Russia may be seen as more reasonable option. 
As producing potential of Norway is declining, Europe is turning its attention to other 
energy producing regions, namely the Middle East, North Africa, and the Caspian Region.
67
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III. INTEREST OF THE EU IN CASPIAN ENERGY 
 
3.1. Overview of Caspian energy market 
Caspian region is considered to be one of the key options to diversify energy suppliers 
to the European Union. All five Caspian littoral states possess enormous energy reserves. 
Uzbekistan is also included in the “Caspian block” although this country does not border with 
the Caspian Sea.68 Taken together, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan possess about 46.2% of world proved natural gas reserves, and about 21% of 
world proved oil reserves.
69
 
After dissolution of the Soviet Union, the new independent states of the Caspian 
region have attracted international attention. Great hopes were vested on the energy potential 
of four newly-formed states of the Caspian region: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, 
and Uzbekistan. Detection of energy resources in the Caspian basin prompted struggle for 
control over energy resources and transportation routes of the region among developed 
countries with high levels of energy consumption. 
Occurrence of hydrocarbon reserves in the area of the Caspian Sea was discovered 
even before the formation of the Soviet Union. For example, oilfield development in 
Azerbaijan began in 1880s
70
. But the extraction of Caspian oil and natural gas was limited in 
late XIX – early XX century, on account of lack of advanced technologies.71 
During the early Soviet era, the potential of the Soviet part of Caspian underwater oil 
fields was estimated to 10-12 billion tones.
72
  There was no technical equipment for deep-sea 
drilling, so the Caspian oilfield development was postponed.  Since 1970s, Povolzhye, Ural 
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and Western Siberia became major producing regions of oil and natural gas in USSR. This 
policy allowed Moscow to establish better control over Soviet energy industry. This meant 
that by 1990s, some areas potentially reach with hydrocarbons around the Caspian Sea 
remained undeveloped.
73
 
For a long time, the region adjacent to the Caspian Sea was under control of only two 
countries: Iran and the USSR. In 1990s, it was unclear, how big the potential of the new 
independent Caspian littoral states was. Speculations about the estimated oil and gas reserves 
in the Caspian basin varied, and in terms overestimated: some argued the potential of the 
region can be compared with those of the Persian Gulf.
74
 
Azerbaijan was already known for its substantial oil reserves in the XIX century, and 
by early XX century this country has become one of the largest oil-producing countries in the 
world
75
. Current estimations of Azerbaijan's proved oil reserves equal to 7 bbl. Basic oil 
production volumes of this country are in the Azeri, Chirag, Guneshli and Shah Deniz fields. 
In addition to significant oil reserves, Azerbaijan possesses up to 1.20 tcm of natural gas (BP, 
2008). 
Kazakhstan is the second largest oil producing country after Russia in the former 
Soviet Union, as it holds about 75% of proved oil reserves of the Caspian basin.
76
 Currently, 
oil reserves of Kazakhstan are estimated at 39.8 bbl.
77
 The country also has deposits of natural 
gas - 1.82 tcm, but gas industry is less developed in the country.
78
 Most oil and gas fields of 
Kazakhstan are situated in the western regions of the country, on the shelf and near the 
Caspian Sea. The major offshore fields of Kazakhstan are Karachaganak, Uzen, Tengiz, and 
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Kashagan.
79
 
According to BP statistics, Turkmenistan is the fourth largest gas producing country in 
the world, holding up to 4.3% (7.94 tcm) of world proved gas reserves. Dauletabad-Donmez, 
Shatlytk and Yashlar are the largest gas fields of Turkmenistan80. Besides that, Turkmenistan 
holds oil reserves estimated at 600 million barrels.
81
 
Of the four “Caspian block” countries, Uzbekistan has the lowest reserves of 
hydrocarbons. This Central Asian country holds up to 1.58 bcm of gas (2008), and its major 
gas fields - Bukhara and Qashqadaryo, - are situated in the Qaraqalpaqistan Autonomous 
Republic. Holding about 600 million barrels of oil, Uzbekistan is a net exporter of oil, as its 
production is declining with each passing year since 1990s.
82
 
Comparison of the oil and gas potential of the four states of the Caspian region is 
presented in the graphs below: 
 
Figure 3: Proved Oil Reserves of the Caspian Region (Source: BP, 2009)                  \ 
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Figure 4: Proved Natural Gas Reserves of the Caspian Region (Source: BP, 2009) 
Total energy potential of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan is 
significant, but cannot be compared with either Russia or the Middle East. According to 
British Petroleum statistics, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan hold about 
3.8% of total world oil reserves (48 billion barrels) and 6.8% of world natural gas reserves 
(12,5 tcm). To compare, Russia holds about 43,3 tcm of natural gas which is 23.4% of world 
gas reserves; oil reserves of Saudi Arabia are about 21% of world reserves (264,1 billion 
barrels), Iran's oil reserves are estimated to be 137,6 billion barrels (share of total 10.9%). 
However, energy potential of the Caspian region is far bigger than those of Europe. It's largest 
energy producer Norway holds only about 7,5 billion barrels of oil (0.6% of world oil reserves) 
and 2,91 tcm of natural gas (1.6% of total gas reserves).
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Figure 5: Proved oil reserves, bbl (Source: BP, 2009) 
 
Figure 6: Proved natural gas reserves, tcm (Source: BP, 2009) 
 
3.2. European Energy Relations with the Caspian Region 
In early 1990s, the Caspian region appeared to be an area of intersection of 
geopolitical and strategic interests of the great powers. Meanwhile, Europe was more 
concerned about the economic aspects of cooperation with the post-Soviet states, and one of 
the most pressing challenges for Europe - lack of energy sources, - has predetermined its 
strategy towards the CIS countries for the next decades. 
In a situation of growing energy consumption and depletion of indigenous reserves of 
oil and gas, the EU sought to obtain access to additional hydrocarbon reserves of the newly-
formed states of the Caspian region. This required formation of energy dialogue between 
Europe and Caspian region, and creation of strategies aimed at enhancing of energy relations 
between them.  
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a) Foreign Direct Investment to the Caspian Energy Sector 
As the Soviet Union fell apart, two processes occurred in the new independent states: 
oil and gas detection around the Caspian basin, and economical collapse of post-Soviet 
Caspian littoral states. Therefore, oil and gas reserves were seen as main sources of revenue 
and economic recovery by the governments of the Caspian countries. They saw that attraction 
of foreign investment into petroleum and natural gas exploration, extraction and export sales 
could encourage economic stabilization and rehabilitation of living standards. Sometimes 
governments of the post-Soviet Caspian littoral states deliberately exaggerated their real 
resource potential in order to attract foreign investment.
84
 As a result, huge investment was 
provided to the countries of the Caspian basin, predominantly from Europe and the United 
States. 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan possess the largest reserves of oil in the Caspian basin, 
while Turkmenistan is leading in gas production. Therefore, Western companies were 
particularly interested in investing energy sector of these three countries. 
Due to substantial reserves of oil and natural gas, Kazakhstan has received the largest 
amounts of foreign direct investment in the CIS. During the first ten years of independence, 
about 13 billion dollars were invested into the country's energy sector, and this contributed to 
production growth in the country
85
. 
Huge amounts of investment flows were received by Azerbaijan as well. Since 1990s, 
investment flows to this country started to grow rapidly, for instance in 1993 the amounts of 
investment to Azerbaijan was $15 million US dollars, while in 2003 this country received 
about 3.7 billion dollars.
86
 
Dictatorial methods of country governance, high levels of corruption, lack of 
economic reforms during Niyazov's presidency caused distrust of foreign investors in 
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favorable investment climate in the country. Since president Berdimuhammedov came to 
power, participation of foreign companies in developing oil and gas fields has risen (Crisis 
Group: 2007). Due to lack of investment, production of oil in Turkmenistan had a tendency to 
decline from 2003, but since 2006 oil production is gaining growth (BP, 2008). 
As in Turkmenistan, the reason for the slow development of oil and gas sector of 
Uzbekistan is the lack of investment, which is also caused by uncertainty of investors in 
political and economic stability in the country. Investment into oil and gas industry to 
Uzbekistan is provided mainly by Russia.
87
 
From the graphs above, it can be seen that oil and gas production stagnated in those 
countries, which obtained insufficient investment: 
 
Figure 7: Dynamics of natural gas production in the Caspian Region (Source: BP, 2009) 
Figure 8: Dynamics of oil production in the Caspian Region (Source: BP, 2009) 
Foreign direct investment from the EU to Central Asian republics reached 2,916 
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million dollars in 1995.
88
 The financial support from world powers assisted these countries in 
their economic recovery and growth of GDP. However, most countries of the region still 
suffer economic turbulence and political instability. Ethnic and interreligious dissension, 
separatism, drug trafficking, illegal arm trade aggravate the current political situation in the 
Caspian bordering countries.
89
 
Volatile world prices on oil and gas can affect the profitability from investment into 
Caspian energy sector. The estimated extraction cost of Caspian oil is relatively low: $5 per 
barrel, which is much more expensive than Middle Eastern oil costs ($1 per barrel). In case 
the prices fall below $12 per barrel the Caspian oilfield development would become 
unprofitable. After the fall of oil prices in 1998, optimistic expectations of the investing 
companies were shuttered.
90
 
The reason of the high costs for Caspian energy is that due to geological difficulties of 
hydrocarbons extraction, expensive technical equipment is required. This is particularly true 
of scavenger oil and gas of Kazakhstan, which are expensive because their extraction requires 
advanced technologies for wells drilling.
91
 
 
b) European oil and gas companies in the Caspian region 
Along with investment provision, participation of European companies in the Caspian 
oil and gas field detection and development served as a tool for the European Union to get 
access to Caspian energy market. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan provided isolationist politics 
and restricted involvement of foreign companies into their energy sector. Extraction of 
Turkmen oil and gas is implemented mainly by state-owned Turkmenneft and Turkmengas. 
Similar situation is in Uzbekistan, where Uzbekneftegaz, a company which is also controlled 
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by the state, is dominating extraction and production of hydrocarbons.
92
 
In Kazakhstan, the largest oil and gas state-owned company KazMunaiGas (KMG) 
participates in oil and gas field development along with foreign companies. Kazakh 
authorities welcomed the involvement of foreign energy corporations, and since 1990s many 
joint ventures on oil and gas field development were created: Kazakhstancaspishelf, 
Kazgermunai, Karachaganak Petroleum Operating, Tengizchevroil, etc.
93
 
In early 1990s, Azerbaijani authorities refused to go to negotiations with foreign oil 
and gas companies, but the government could not provide investment to the energy due to the 
poor economic situation in the country. Finally, in 1994 the fundamental agreement on joint 
development of Caspian Azeri, Chirag, and Guneshli fields known as the 'Contract of the 
Century' was signed.
94
 It was the first contract between Azerbaijani state-owned SOCAR 
(State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic) and 10 international petroleum companies.
95
 
SOCAR, the largest oil and gas company in Azerbaijan, provides a full spectrum of oil and 
gas operations associated with oil and gas exploration, extraction, processing and 
transportation.  British Petroleum, Lukoil, Amoco, Pennzoil, Unocal, Exxon Mobile, Itochu 
and many other companies were involved in various projects on field development.
96
 
During the discovery and development of oil and gas in the Caspian region, Western 
companies had to face with several challenges. Raballand and Gente have identified three 
major risks faced by foreign oil and gas companies and investors in the Caspian basin: 
geological risk, technical risk and political risk.
97
 
Geological risk is due to the fact of hard conditions of oil and gas extraction in the 
Caspian Sea. This leads to technical risk, which is associated with availability of special 
                                                 
92
 Crisis Group (2007) 
93
 Salygin, Safarjan (2005) 
94
 http://www.old.caspenergy.com/no2rus11.html (30.03.2010) 
95
 Akiner (2004) 
96
 Salygin, Safarjan (2005) 
97
 Raballand, Gente (2008) 
36 
 
equipment for deep-sea drilling and extraction of resources on the surface. Both risks are easy 
to overcome in case if sufficient investment is provided. 
The political risk is associated with group of threats: threat of territorial, ethnic or 
religious conflicts in the region, threat of appearance of radical Muslim movements, terrorist 
activities and absence of agreement on delimitation of the Caspian Sea.
98
 For foreign 
companies and investors it was hard to come to agreement on terms of oil and gas field 
development and aggravation of any regional conflicts (e.g. Nagorno-Karabakh) can 
complicate the process
99
. 
Not least important is the unresolved status of the Caspian Sea. After four new 
independent states appeared by the Caspian coastline, the question of its delimitation arose 
among its littoral countries. During the Soviet period, there was no agreement on exploitation 
of energy sources of the Caspian Sea shelf, and no official sea boundary between USSR and 
Iran existed. After the collapse of Soviet Union and the reveal of oil and gas fields in the 
Caspian Sea, no consensus on the question of Caspian Sea delimitation among Caspian littoral 
states was achieved. 
The controversy on whether the Caspian is a 'sea' or a 'lake' creates uncertainty over 
the methods of its delimitation. According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, the Caspian should be equally divided between its littoral states. But if the Caspian is 
considered to be a lake, a condominium approach of its exploitation should be implemented. 
The unsolved problem remains crucial for both international and national oil and gas 
companies which seek to extract undersea reserves of the Caspian.
100
 
Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan concluded bilateral agreements on the sea 
delimitation; however, other countries are not satisfied with this division. Iran insists on 
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division of the Caspian between its littoral states on equal parts (20% each). This contradicts 
to the median line principle, which is supported by Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Another 
solution supported by Iran is the common use of Caspian resources by its bordering states on 
the principle of condominium. However, this creates obstacles for international companies 
who are willing to make offshore extraction of Caspian hydrocarbons. Disagreement between 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan about Kyapaz/Serdar oilfield along with other disputes on the 
Caspian Sea division hinders development of energy resources of the region.
101
 
Another complicating issue for foreign companies was that Caspian oil and gas fields 
are situated far away from major energy consumers, and therefore transportation from 
Caucasus and Central Asia requires involvement of transit countries. 
 
c) European strategies towards the Caspian littoral states 
European strategy towards the Caspian littoral states has not been worked out till 1995, 
and the first strategies of the EU were aimed primarily to the investment provision to oil and 
gas detection and development. The first European programme which aimed to enhance 
cooperation with the Caspian littoral states was the Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to 
Europe (INOGATE) created in 1995. The programme was funded under TACIS (Technical Aid 
to the Commonwealth of Independent States) in order to facilitate the development of energy 
sector via provision of necessary investment.
102
 
Allocation of funds to energy sector development of the Caspian region countries is 
certainly not enough in Europe‟s seek to diversify energy suppliers. The major issue for the 
EU in its quest to enhance energy security is to create transportation networks to delivery oil 
and natural gas and make it accessible for the European market. 
Being aware of the problems of transportation of Caspian energy, European authorities 
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have changed their strategy towards Caspian region countries the early 2000s. Since then, 
Europe has set its sights on increased support of development of new pipeline networks 
binding Caspian region and the European Union. 
The major objectives of the newly-formed European strategy were enshrined in the 
2001 INOGATE Umbrella Agreement, which was created in order to establish the rules of 
energy cooperation of the EU with countries of the former Soviet Union. The Agreement 
promoted investment provision for modernization of old pipelines and creation of pipeline 
networks to delivery Caspian oil and gas to Europe.
103104
 
The Baku initiative, launched in 2004, also aims to facilitate the integration of Caspian 
oil and gas into the European energy markets. To achieve this goal, the European Union has 
committed to provide the necessary financial support for upgrading existing infrastructure, 
improvement of technical equipment, and new projects development. It is worth emphasizing 
that the Initiative aimed the provision of support to any projects for transportation of Caspian 
oil and gas to Europe, including those passing territories of Russia and Iran.
105
 However, 2nd 
Energy Ministerial Conference demonstrated reduction of Russia's interest in the Baku 
Initiative, whereas Iran left the programme.
106
 
As stated in the European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, “Enhancing our 
strategic energy partnership with neighbouring countries is a major element of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy”. The Strategy notes the special role of countries of Central Asia and 
South Caucasus of new energy importers in the European Union, and the EU aims to improve 
energy network connections with the countries of Caspian bordering states.
107
 
The European Community Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) for Assistance to Central 
                                                 
103
 http://www.mfa.gov.rs/ForeignInvest/Inogate_e.htm (15.04.2010) 
104
 http://www.inogate.org/inogate_programme/inogate_archives/inogate-umbrella-agreement (7.04.2010) 
105
 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/international/regional/caspian/energy_en.htm (15.04.2010) 
106
 Denison (2009) 
107
 EU Commission (2004): “European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper” Brussels 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf (7.04.2010) 
39 
 
Asia for the period 2007-2013 highlighted the importance of the Central Asian region in 
diversification of energy supplies to the EU, and called for development of “mutually 
beneficial dialogue between energy producers, transit countries and consumers at both 
bilateral and regional level”.108 Development of the Southern Gas Corridor to supply Caspian 
and Middle Eastern gas to Europe has been an integral part of the EU Energy Security and 
Solidarity Action Plan.
109
 
The ongoing two-year (2008 – 2010) project Enhancement of environmental 
protection measures in the oil/gas industry of Central Asia (EPMOGI) calls for increase of the 
share of energy supplies from Central Asia to the European Union, emphasizing importance 
of environmental protection and sustainable development.
110
 
 
d) Pipelines to supply Caspian energy sources to Europe 
In 1990s, creation of new pipeline networks from the Caspian region to Europe was 
necessary for several reasons. First of all, the old pipeline system created in the Soviet times 
required reconstruction and modernization. Secondly, the existing pipeline system could not 
manage to deliver the growing amounts of energy produced in the region. And one of the most 
important issues is that Caspian oil and gas could have been transported to the global markets 
only through Russian territory.  
The old Soviet pipeline infrastructure tied this region with Russia only, and after the 
break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia put its efforts to keep control over Caspian energy 
production and transportation. The old pipeline system allowed Russia to influence Caspian 
energy exports, as well as energy pricing.  There was a question of whether or not Caspian 
littoral states will still be dependent on Russia, or diversify their pipelines away from Russian 
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pipeline system.
111
 
The first pipeline project to deliver Caspian energy to Western markets was the 
Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). The project was supposed to transport oil from 
Azerbaijani Shakh Deniz and Kazakh Tengiz oilfields to Russian port Novorossiysk, from 
which the oil would be shipped to the Western markets. The pipeline was especially important 
for Kazakhstan, as it could reduce the purchase prices for exported Kazakh oil. The CPC 
launched in 2001 was the first privately owned pipeline in the region: the venture was jointly 
owned by Kazakh, Russian and Omani oil companies. The Omanis were involved in order to 
achieve international control over oil transportation via CPC not to let Russians control oil 
exports from Central Asia.
112
 
Another option for transportation of Azerbaijani oil to Western markets is the Baku-
Supsa pipeline, also known as Western Route Export Pipeline (WREP). This 145,000 bbl/d 
capacity pipeline goes from Azerbaijani oilfields to Georgian port Baku, from which oil is 
shipped across Bosporus strains to Europe.
113
 Baku-Supsa entered into operation in 1999 had 
been important in the delivery of Caspian oil in early 2000s, as the average cost for the oil 
transported via this pipeline is relatively lower than via any other Azerbaijani pipeline.
114
 
From 2006, when the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline capable to supply up to 1 
million bbl/d of oil to Western markets was created, WREP has lost its significance. BTC is a 
large-scale project to supply Caspian oil to Western markets, bypassing both Russia and 
Iran.
115
 This pipeline delivers Kazakh and Azerbaijani offshore crude oil to Turkish port 
Ceyhan, from which the oil is shipped to European markets across the Mediterranean Sea. 
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The pipeline construction was backed by the United States and Turkey.
116
 Creation of the BPC 
was of particular importance for the European countries, as it lowers European dependency on 
both Middle Eastern and Russian oil supplies. 
The European Union has been less successful in diversifying its gas supplies. The only 
pipeline to deliver Caspian gas to European markets is the South Caucasus (SPC), also known 
as Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline. This pipeline runs parallel to BTC from Baku to 
Turkish city of Erzurum, and supplies Azerbaijani gas to Georgia and Turkey.
117
 The SCP is 
connected with the Turkey-Greece pipeline, which allows Azerbaijani gas to flow to the EU 
markets. However, gas flows from Central Asia to Europe are implemented via Russian 
pipeline system only. 
The Central Asia-Center (CAC) gas pipeline system remains the only export output to 
European countries, the shortest international transit to delivery Turkmen and Uzbek gas 
through Kazakhstan to Russia and further on to Europe. The pipeline was extended several 
times both during and after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
118
 Today, Russia is interested in 
increasing gas supplies from Central Asia via CAC route, and several long-term agreements 
were recently signed between Russia and Central Asian gas producing countries concerning 
long-term shipment of gas via CAC pipeline system. These agreements obligate Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to deliver certain amounts of gas to Russia in order to prevent 
gas flows from Central Asia to the world markets via alternative routes.
119
 
Meanwhile, Europe strives to reduce its dependence on Russian gas supplies, and the 
EU is interested in construction of bypassing route which would enable flows of Caspian gas 
to European markets. The route that could delivery Caspian gas to Europe consists of three 
pipelines: Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP), South Caucasus Pipeline and Nabucco. Trans-
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Caspian Gas Pipeline is a proposed pipeline to supply Central Asian gas to Azerbaijan, where 
the pipeline could be connected to the existing South Caucasus Pipeline. Further gas flows to 
Europe would be carried out via the proposed Nabucco pipeline, which could be connected to 
the SCP in Erzurum. 
The Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) to bring gas from Central Asia beneath the 
Caspian Sea to Azerbaijani port in Baku was first proposed in 1998.
120
 According to the 
project, the 30 bcm/year capacity pipeline was supposed to deliver 14 bcm of natural gas to 
the EU, and 16 bcm - to Turkey. The initial idea of the Trans-Caspian pipeline was to supply 
Turkmen and Azerbaijani gas to Turkey and further – to Europe.121 
The idea of the pipeline construction was negatively perceived by two Caspian littoral 
states: Russia and Iran. Russia insisted that for construction of the pipeline approval from all 
Caspian bordering states is required, because the pipeline may have a negative impact to the 
Caspian Sea environment.
122
 Iran also maintained the position, that the pipeline construction 
can be vetoed by any of the Caspian littoral states, until the conditions of delimitation will not 
be achieved.
123
 
In 1999, Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline consortium was created by Bechtel Group, 
General Electric and Shell, and Agreement supporting the pipeline construction was signed by 
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Georgia and Turkey.
124
 In 2000, agreements on gas supplies from 
Turkmenistan to Turkey, and from Azerbaijan to Turkey were signed. But the project was 
finally canceled, due to disagreements on gas pricing, and volumes of exported gas between 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.
125
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TCGP was backed by the USA in 1990s, but European interest to the project was 
intensified later. During his meeting to Astana, Kazakhstan in 2004, EU Energy 
Commissioner Andris Piebalgs expressed his support to the TCGP pipeline and assured that 
the European Commission “definitely support(s) construction of the trans-Caspian pipeline 
as this would provide the EU with extra gas.”126  New to the Trans-Caspian project was 
proposal on Kazakhstan‟s joining the project as a gas supplier. According to plan, the TCGP 
could connect Kazakh gas field Tengiz with Turkmen port of Turkmenbashi.
127
 Resumption of 
international attention to the TCGP project was associated with a proposal of construction of 
another pipeline – Nabucco. 
Nabucco pipeline is the proposed 31 bcm/year capacity pipeline from Turkey through 
Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary to Austria which should bring gas from the Persian Gulf and 
the Caspian region. In 2004, Nabucco Gas Pipeline International Ltd. was formed by OMV 
(Austria), MOL (Hungary), Transgaz (Romania), BEH (Bulgaria), Botas (Turkey), and RWE 
(Germany).
128
 
Intergovernmental agreement on the pipeline construction was signed on July 13th, 
2009,
 129
 and by signing the contract all the participating countries approved their involvement 
in the project. The European Union in general favoured the idea of the pipeline construction, 
seeing that implementation of Trans-Caspian and Nabucco projects could serve the 
enhancement of European energy security.  European Commission President Jose Manuel 
Barroso welcomed the Agreement, noting in his speech that “the Nabucco project is of crucial 
importance for Europe's energy security and its policy of diversification of gas supplies and 
transport routes.”130 
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Václav Bartuška, the ambassador-at-large for energy security is less optimistic to 
Nabucco. During his speech at the International Energy Regulation Forum held in Prague on 
March 24, 2010 he said that "The original idea of Nabucco is still valid and important, but I 
question if it will ever be carried out… Nabucco is nothing on its own; it's all about getting an 
energy mix, which involves all these things combined."
131
 
After several delays, the pipeline construction was finally scheduled to begin in 
2011
132
. It is expected that the pipeline will be filled with Caspian and Middle Eastern gas
133
. 
However, it is not clear yet, which countries will supply gas to Europe via Nabucco. Due to 
instability in the Middle East, great hopes are vested on gas supplies from the Caspian region. 
EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs believes that the European Union must 
reduce its dependence on Russian energy supplies by accelerating the planned Nabucco 
pipeline to bring gas from Central Asia and expresses the need for "political engagement to 
remove all the obstacles to Nabucco to bring gas from the Caspian basin to the EU."
134
 
Importance of energy supplies from the Caspian region was emphasized by German 
Energy Commissioner Gunther Oettinger. During the EU Commission discussion dedicated to 
major energy projects under the European economic recovery plan (EERP) in March 2010, he 
noted that "Nabucco is not just a possible new pipeline, but a new Caspian source of 
production. That reduces our dependency. We are now seeking binding commitments from 
companies to take part in this project."
135
 
Although the idea of supplying Caspian gas may seem good in theory, in practice there 
are many obstacles to the projects implementation. The major issue is that there is no 
confidence in the fact that Nabucco and TCGP could really be able to provide Europe with 
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better energy security. Furthermore, none of the Caspian countries have approved their 
participation in the pipeline projects yet, and there is no confidence in their participation.   
 
IV. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Given that energy potential of the Caspian region is significant, some scholars and 
policymakers argue that Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan may become 
alternative gas suppliers to the EU, contribute to European energy security and lower the EU‟s 
dependence on Russian gas supplies. On the other hand, there is also an opinion that the 
impact of Caspian gas supplies to European energy security is minimal, and that it will not 
change the fact of European reliance on Russian energy.  
In the previous Chapter, the energy potential of the Caspian region was described, and 
it was found out that Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan possess 
substantial reserves of natural gas. Therefore, majority of scholars dealing with issues related 
to Caspian energy and opportunities of energy supplies to the European Union agree that 
Caspian region produces sufficient energy to supply Europe in case of Nabucco and TCGP 
projects realization.  
Significance of gas supplies from Turkmenistan is of paramount importance of the EU, 
as the country holds fourth largest natural gas reserves in the world.  As assured by Stephen 
Blank „The recent examination of Turkmenistan’s gas fields confirms that it has enough gas 
to supply Europe with the required amounts of gas through Nabucco if the pipeline can be 
built“.136  
Michael Denison looking at the opportunities to diversify gas suppliers to Europe, 
defines Turkmenistan as „the EU’s strategic priority for engagement on energy issues.“137 
The researcher notes the needs for energy supplies from Azerbaijan for the first phase of 
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Nabucco pipeline, but also underscores the neccesity of additional gas suppliers to reach 31 
bcm target by 2020. Zeyno Baran also emphasizes the importance of gas supplies from 
Azerbaijan, noting that „In nine years, Azerbaijan could export one-third of the amount that 
Russia currently sends to Europe“.138 
Participation of Iran and Iraq in the Nabucco project is doubtful, due to number of 
political and economical obstacles.
139140
 Iraq‟s problem is the unresolved question on the 
hydrocarbon resources ownership between Iraqi and Kurdish authorities. Lack of investment 
to Iraq‟s energy sector also hinder this country‟s participation in Nabucco.141 As for Iran, this 
country does not have sufficient export gas to fill the pipeline, and for this reason supplies 
from Azerbaijan, and in particular from Turkmenistan are of strategic importance for the EU: 
„As Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have the capability to fill the bulk of the pipeline, a joint 
push from Europe and the U.S. in realizing this would likely be far more positively received 
among investors than relying on Iranian gas.“142 The amounts of gas which could flow from 
Egypt are not enough to fill the pipeline, whereas Central Asia is „very much in the frame as 
a key resource base for the EU’s southern corridor strategy.“143  
Thus, we can conclude that the supples of gas from Azerbaijan and Central Asia are 
considered to be of high priority to the realisation of Nabucco project. However, will the 
realisation of Nabucco and TCGP in fact contribute to the improvement of European energy 
security? Under improvement of EU energy security, majority of scholars imply not only 
diversification of energy suppliers, but in particular reduction of European dependence on 
Russian gas.  
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Paul Belkin considers that „There can be no doubt that the energy resources of the 
Caspian Sea region can offer Europe a viable alternative source of energy supply,“144  due to 
huge reserves of natural gas of the region. Caspian region „can contribute to the 
diversification of oil and gas supplies to Europe, which will add to Europe’s energy security,“ 
145
- he sais.  
Cornell compares energy potential of Russia and other Caspian littoral states, denoting 
that „the energy producers of the Caspian region … have an export potential equal to or 
greater than that of Gazprom“146, but due to the fact that contrary to Russia countries of 
Centrla Asia and Caucasus consume smaller amounts of energy, they could provide Europe 
with substantial amounts of natural gas and therefore diversify Europe‟s energy market. 
Therefore, „the potential entry of Caspian natural gas to Europe through the South Caucasus 
and Turkey would help Europe diversify its energy supplies, and to reduce dependence on the 
state-owned Russian monopoly Gazprom“.147  
Denison defines Central Asian gas supplies as not pivotal, and in his view 
Turkmenistan, Central Asia‟s gas producing leader, can become „supplementary supplier to 
the projected Nabucco pipeline and therefore a useful new source to balance dependence on 
Russian gas.“  
Marta Brill Olcott questions the importance of Central Asian gas supplies for the EU 
energy diversification, noting that „Central Asian natural gas is a less viable option for 
fulfilling much of Europe’s energy demands.“148 because of high market prices of Central 
Asian gas and lack of support to the construction of Trans-Caspian pipeline. Zeyno Baran 
claims that if the Trans-Caspian pipeline is constructed, it will make little sence for the new 
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EU member-states, which are almost entirely dependent on Russian gas, and they „could be 
vulnerable to cuts in retaliation for perceived acts against Russian interests“.149 
International Crisis Group also gives critical assessment to the idea of gas supplies 
from the Caspian region to the EU, doubting economic sence of Trans-Caspian pipeline and 
claiming that Nabucco pipeline will not free Europe from relying on Russia. The only 
consequence of the TCGP project realization is that it will be more difficult for Russia to meet 
European energy demand.
150
 
The possibility of Nabucco and Trans-Caspian pipeline projects implementation is 
another question to be addressed, as in case of the projects failure, no gas could be supplied to 
Europe from Central Asia, and only limited amounts from Azerbaijan.   
Cornell assumes that Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan could realize gas 
supplies to Europe via routes which bypass Russia becaust the EU can offer more profitable 
price for the Caspian gas then Russia. The analyst also adheres to the point of view that it 
would be more efficient for Europe to purchase Caspian gas via direct pipeline than via 
Russian pipeline system. Currently, Russia controls prices on Caspian gas, and cells it to 
Europe at inflated prices, but direct gas flows from the Caspian littoral states would create a 
„competitive market with multiple operators“. Therefore, the European Union should 
facilitate the construction of the East-West gas corridor.
151
 
Norling also holds the view, that „The Nabucco natural gas pipeline may become the 
backbone in Europe’s push for natural gas diversification,“ and improved relations between 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan countries in 2006 could set the stage towards the Trans-Caspian 
pipeline construction. 
152
 
Many scholars agree that plenty of obstacles can put in question TCGP and Nabucco 
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projects implementation. Unresloved legal status of the Caspian Sea and uncertainty about the 
long-term stability in the region are among the major impediments to the route 
construction.
153
  
Zeyno Baran emphasizes, that Nabucco can make commersial sence only if the 
European Union takes timely actions in respect of attraction of Central Asian gas producing 
countries to participate in TCGP and Nabucco projects. Europe‟s incompetence in 
maintaining common energy security, failure to secure consensus among suppliers, and 
uncertaincy regaring participation of Turkey in the Nabucco project, reduce the probability of 
the project implementation.
154
 
Russian anti-Nabucco actions, such as long-term contracts on gas supplies from 
Central Asia, and lobbying tactics with Hungary can deprive the pipelines construction.
155
 
Another country that can oppose TCGP is Iran, according to International Crisis Group.
156
 
Besides that, complex relationships between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan cast doubts on 
participation of the later in TCGP, whereas amounts of gas produced by Kazakhstan are not 
enough to fill the pipeline. 
Gyulmira Rzayeva doubts participation of either Central Asian countries or Iran in the 
Nabucco project, and sais that „Ensuring the Nabucco project of Caspian natural gas seems 
unlikely“. Turkmenistan will rather increase supplies to Iran and China, while Iran‟s 
participation is doubtful until an agreement on its nuclear program is achieved. 
157
This view is 
also shared by Olcott, according to whom Central asian gas reserves are „realistically 
marketable predominantly to Russian and Chinese markets, and limitedly in Europe.“158 
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V. RESEARCH METHODS 
In Chapters II and III Europe‟s need for energy diversification was explained, and the 
reasons why the Caspian region is seen as an option to enhance EU energy security were 
determined. The debate among scholars provided in the Literature Review showed, that there 
is no consensus about the possible contribution of Caspian gas supplies to the EU energy 
diversification. The Research Methods Chapter provides the details of the research strategy 
adopted to study this issue. 
In order to estimate the impact of Caspian gas supplies to European energy security, 
two research methods are applied: comparative analysis and case study analysis. The analysis 
provided in the present research is qualitative in its nature, as the findings of data statistics are 
supplemented with current political and economic realities. Taken together, all research 
methods complement each other, and help to come to the proof of the hypothesis. 
In order to determine how gas supplies from the Caspian region can contribute to the 
EU energy diversification the present research aims to define three issues: 
1. Do Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have enough gas to 
supply to the European Union? 
2. Will the Caspian region countries supply their gas to Europe bypassing Russia? 
3. What is the impact of the TCGP and Nabucco pipeline projects to the European 
energy security in case of their implementation? 
Addressing the question of whether Caspian countries produce sufficient amounts of 
gas to be supplied to Europe, comparative analysis of Russian and Caspian production levels 
is applied. To address the second question, political discourse is provided in order to identify 
the major drivers and barriers for each of the Caspian states to participate in the projects are 
determined. Finally, the impact of TCGP and Nabucco to European energy security is 
determined by calculation of the share of European needs that could be satisfied with gas 
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supplies from the Caspian region. 
The first part of analysis represents comparative analysis of the dynamics of 
production growth and net export potential of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, and Russia – the present major importer of natural gas to the European Union. 
The first part of the analysis is based on two sources: statistics provided by BP Statistical 
Review of World Energy 2009 and World Energy Outlook 2008. The BP Statistical Review 
provides data on proved natural gas reserves, annual changes of production, and consumption 
levels of Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. On the basis of BP 
statistics, calculations of net export volumes of the Caspian region countries are made. The 
comparison of export potential of the four post-Soviet Caspian region countries and Russia is 
applied in order to estimate, whether energy potential, production levels and net export levels 
can compete with, overbalance, or at least undermine role of Russia as a major gas supplier to 
the European Union. Graphs based on data from World Energy Outlook 2008 illustrate future 
developments of production levels of Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. This is applied 
in order to estimate, whether gas production of the two major gas producing countries of 
Central Asia will exceed Russian levels of production in the future. 
Further, an attempt to estimate the amounts of natural gas that could potentially flow 
from the Caspian region to the European Union taking into account the obligations of 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to sell their gas to other customers is 
examined. The second part of analysis is a case study analysis of 2007 natural gas exports 
from region to its customers: Russia, Iran, Turkey and Georgia. This is applied in order to 
determine the amounts of gas that could be supplied to additional customer or customers.  The 
data on 2007 production, consumption and net export volumes of natural gas is based on 
International Energy Agency statistics. Data on the amounts of natural gas supplied from the 
Caspian region to external markets is based on US Energy Information Administration 
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Country Analysis.  
To date, apart from the EU, three other countries are seeking to be major importers of 
Caspian gas: Russia, China and Iran. The third part represents a political discourse of actions 
and decisions implemented by EU competitors, in order to estimate the obstacles that can 
hinder Europe in its quest to diversify its energy with Caspian gas. Also, policy orientations of 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are analyzed in order to estimate the 
likelihood of participation of each Caspian country in European projects of gas supplies. This 
part of analysis is based on political decisions, current political events, statements made by 
officials at official meetings, summits and conferences, taken from press releases, agreement 
summaries, official speeches, and news articles. 
The final, fourth part is a case study analysis of a pipeline corridor to supply Caspian 
gas to the EU consisting of TCGP, SCP and Nabucco pipelines is provided. To date, this 
corridor is the most viable option to diversify European energy imports with Caspian gas 
apart from Russia, and therefore estimations of pipeline costs, capacities, time frames, 
participating countries is provided. The analysis of pipeline capacities is applied to determine 
the share of Caspian supplies to EU future needs for energy imports. Accordingly to the 
findings, the conclusion of the contribution of Caspian gas supplies to European energy 
diversification is made. 
 
VI. ANALYSIS 
6.1. Comparative analysis of natural gas export abilities of Caspian countries and 
Russia  
To understand the impact the Caspian region countries can bring to diversify European 
energy supplies, it is necessary to examine the export potential of the region. Theoretically, 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are able to supply substantial amounts 
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of natural gas to Europe. That is true, given that production levels in each of the country are 
growing. 
In the previous chapters, an explanation of Europe's unwillingness to depend on 
Russian gas supplies was provided. Therefore, in order to get a better understanding of the 
role the Caspian gas supplies could play in European energy market, it is necessary to 
compare the gas potential, production levels and estimated net export volumes of this region 
with Russian ones. A comparative analysis should be done in order to estimate whether or not 
the Caspian region countries could compete with, overbalance, or at least undermine Russian 
dominance in energy market of the European Union.  
 
Figure 9: Proved Natural Gas reserves of the Caspian Region (Source: BP 2009) 
 
From the table above, it is seen that natural gas reserves of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are far less than those of Russia. According to BP estimations, 
natural gas reserves of the four Caspian countries equal 12.5 tcm (6.8% of world share). This 
means that even taken together, all the post-Soviet Caspian littoral states cannot compete with 
Russia, which holds 43.3 tcm of proved gas reserves (23.4% of world share). 
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Figure 10: Production growth of the Caspian Region (Source: BP, 2009)  
From the chart above, it can be noticed that natural gas production volumes in Russia 
are much higher than production volumes of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan. For instance, in 2008 Russia produced some 601.7 bcm of natural gas, while 
173.2 were produced by Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The figure of 
production growth is growing both in Russia and the four Caspian region countries, and 
according to IEA estimation, this trend will continue in the future. 
In 2006, gas production of two major gas producers of Central Asia Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan was amounted to 90 bcm, but this figure is expected to reach 132 bcm in 2015, 
and 151 bcm in 2030 (IEA). However, even in 2030 the volumes of gas produced by these 
two countries taken together will lag behind the production level of Russian Federation. 
According to International Energy Agency, Russia is expected to produce about 712 bcm in 
2015 and 794 bcm of natural gas in 2030. 
 
Figure 11: Production prospects of the Caspian region (Source: World Energy Outlook, IEA, 2009) 
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
0,0
100,0
200,0
300,0
400,0
500,0
600,0
700,0
800,0
900,0
Russia
AZ, KZ, TM, UZ
2006 2015 2030
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan
Russia
55 
 
 
In this comparison it must be emphasized that level of natural gas consumption is 
much higher in Russia than in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
Consequently, comparison of net export volumes could better illustrate export abilities of the 
countries reviewed. 
Figure 12: Net export growth of the Caspian Region (Source: BP, 2008) 
 
From the graph based on the British Petroleum statistics (2008) it is seen that net 
export volume of Azerbaijan and the three Central Asian countries is much lower than in 
Russia. However, it can be noticed that net export volumes of the four Caspian littoral states 
have a tendency to more rapid growth. Accordingly, it is possible that in the future the 
volumes of Caspian natural gas that could enter the world market will grow. 
The fact that Caspian region has substantial gas reserves, and productivity of 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan is growing cannot be avoided. 
However, the gas potential of the four Caspian countries can be assessed as average, rather 
than very high, in comparison with huge production levels of Russia - the key natural gas 
supplier to Europe. 
 
6.2. Case study: Caspian gas exports in 2007 
Today's situation with natural gas exports from the Caspian region to external markets 
does not include a possibility for any potential gas importer from the region to get access to 
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Caspian energy market. For instance, in 2007 according to the International Energy Agency 
statistics, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan produced a considerable 
amount of natural gas – 161.5 bcm. Net export of the four countries was amounted to 73 bcm, 
out of which 72 bcm were supplied to external markets (Russia, Iran, Turkey and Georgia). 
This means, that in 2007 only 1 bcm remained affordable for additional gas importer. 
 
Table 1: Natural gas production, consumption and export (Source: IEA, 2007) 
 
 Table 2: Natural gas exports (Source: EIA, 2007) 
All in all, it is hard to estimate the amounts of gas that could be supplied to Europe 
from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in the future, because the share 
of energy supplies from the Caspian region to various external markets changes each year due 
to political, economic and social reasons.  
It should be kept in mind that except for the European Union, three other countries 
claim to supply significant volumes of Caspian energy: Russia, China and Iran. Given that 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan do not possess enough reserves to 
satisfy needs of all competing parties, the governments of the gas-producing countries will 
have to choose priority consumer or consumers. 
 
Natural gas production, consumption and export (IEA, 2007)
(bcm) production consumption (net) export
Azerbaijan 11.0 9.3 1.7
Kazakhstan 12.9 10.6 2.3
Turkmenistan 72.3 18.0 54.3
Uzbekistan 65.3 50.6 14.7
total: 161.5 88.5 73.0
Natural gas exports (EIA, 2007)
bcm Azerbaijan Kazakhstan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan
to Russia 5.5 48.1 10.5
to Iran 0.2 6.2
to Turkey 1.2
to Georgia 0.3
within Central Asia 3.2 4.2
total: 1.7 2.3 54.3 14.7
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6.3. Political discourse: barriers to participation of Caspian countries in 
European projects 
a) Competitors of the EU for Caspian natural gas 
Today, Russia is a major exporter of natural gas to the European Union, and Kremlin 
does not want to change its monopolistic position on gas supplies to Europe. Central Asian 
gas helps Russia to meet energy demands of the EU, and to maintain dominance over the 
European gas market. Besides that, Russia will not have to develop inaccessible gas deposits 
of Eastern Siberia if it continues to purchase large volumes of Central Asian gas
159
. 
Consequently, Europe's surge to install gas supplies from the Caspian region bypassing Russia 
met negative reaction of the latter and forced Moscow to take measures aimed at 
strengthening its influence over energy sector of Central Asian republics. 
These measures take various forms, for instance, Kremlin signs long-term contracts 
with Central Asian gas producers
160
, offers alternative pipeline routes to impede construction 
of pipelines which do not meet Russian interests. For instance, Russian response to a 
projected pipeline from Turkmenistan through the Caspian Sea and Turkey to Europe was a 
rapid construction of a Blue Stream pipeline through the Black Sea and Turkey.
161
 
Soon after the Nabucco pipeline was proposed, Russia started backing another route to 
supply gas to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe – South Stream. The pipeline 
project aims to supply Russian gas beneath the Black Sea (bypassing Turkey), to Bulgaria. In 
case if the pipeline is constructed, 63 mcm of gas will flow to the European Union, which 
exceeds Nabucco's capacity more than twice.
162
 
In June 2007, a Memorandum of Understanding to implement the South Stream 
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project was signed by Eni and Gazprom, and the following year the South Stream AG Special 
Purpose Entity was registered in Switzerland.
 163
 In fact, the construction of the large capacity 
South Stream pipeline calls into question the need for Nabucco. Nevertheless, Bulgaria, 
Austria and Hungary are going to participate in both projects. On January, 2008 Russia and 
Bulgaria have signed intergovernmental agreement on South Stream construction, similar 
agreements were signed with Hungary, Slovenia, and Greece. In May 2009, Serbia agreed the 
construction of pipeline on its territory. Recently, Austria joined the South Stream project as 
well, signing the agreement with Russian government on April 24
th
, 2010.
164
 
In its seek to keep control over Central Asia‟s gas supplies, Russia plans to increase 
the capacity of existing Central Asia – Center pipeline, and also proposes new pipeline 
projects to Central Asian republics. For instance, the proposed Pre-Caspian (Prikaspisky) gas 
pipeline to bring 10 bcm of Kazakh gas and 30 bcm of Turkmen gas to Russia
165
  would 
strengthen Russia‟s influence to Central Asia, and would become a further step for Gazprom 
to strengthen its control over gas flows from this region.  
On December, 2007 a trilateral intergovernmental Agreement of Cooperation for the 
construction of the Pre-Caspian Gas Pipeline was signed by Russia, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan.
 166
 The document was ratified by Nazarbayev only in May, 2009, whereas 
Berdimuhammedov have not ratified the agreement.
167
 No consortium on the gas pipeline 
construction was yet created, and the refusal of Turkmenistan to participate in the most 
important segment of the pipeline can put doubts on the project implementation. 
Russia aimed to deepen its influence in energy sector of Turkmenistan and get access 
to one of the largest gas fields in the world Yolotan to the coast of the Caspian Sea. According 
to Russia‟s plan, the field should be connected to the Pre-Caspian pipeline via the proposed 
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“East-West” pipeline, but the leader of Turkmenistan proved to be controversial again. 
Berdimuhammedov should have signed an agreement on the joint construction of the “East-
West” pipeline during his visit to Moscow on 24 - 25 March, 2009, but this did not happen.168 
Subsequently, the right to develop one of Turkmenistan‟s major gas fields was given to a 
consortium of companies from China, the United Arab Emirates and South Korea.
169
 
To resists gas flows from the Caspian region to Western markets, Russia buys huge 
volumes of Caspian gas, so that there would be no gas left to be supplied to non-Russian 
customers. With this purpose, Russia signs long-term contracts with Central Asian countries 
and Azerbaijan on the annual supply of certain amounts of gas. 
The long-term contract on purchasing Azerbaijani gas by Russia was signed in 2009. 
This meant that Russia became an importer of Azerbaijani gas for the first time in its history. 
According to the Russia-Azerbaijani Gas Agreement Russia buys Azerbaijani gas at $350 per 
thousand cubic meters
170
. The agreement obligates Azerbaijan to supply to Russia at least 500 
mcm of gas annually from 2010 to 2014
171
. 
Russia has also agreed annual supplies from Kazakh oil and gas giant Karachaganak. 
In 2006, the Kazakh-Russian joint venture was created on the base of Orenburg gas refinery 
in Russia. Kazakhstan and Russia signed a Declaration on long-term cooperation in 
processing of Karachaganak, according to which, natural gas would be annually processed 
from the gas field to the Orenburg plant. The agreement also designates that out of 16 bcm 
supplied to the refinery, 6 bcm should be bought by Gazprom. Earlier, in 2002 a KazRosGaz 
joint venture was created in order to upgrade pipeline network between Russia and 
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Kazakhstan.
172
  
The largest deal on gas purchasing was signed between Russia and Turkmenistan in 
April, 2003. According to the Agreement of Cooperation in the Gas Industry, Turkmenistan 
should increase its gas supplies to Russian Federation to 70-80 bcm/year by year 2028
173
. 
Another agreement signed the same day by Gazprom and Turkmenneftegaz, assumed that 
Gazprom will provide financial support to gas fields development and pipeline network 
construction between Turkmenistan and Russia. In fact, the agreements implied that exports 
of Turkmen gas will be partly controlled by Russia.  
Another important point of the agreement (Agreement of Cooperation in the Gas 
Industry) was the increase of purchasing prices for Turkmen gas in order to encourage 
Turkmen side to cooperate with Russia in energy trade. According to the new pricing policy, 
from 2009 Russia pays 225-295 dollars per thousand cubic meters instead of 140 USD.
174
 
In April, 2009 relations between Russia and Turkmenistan deteriorated as a result of 
the accident on the CAC-4 pipeline. Turkmen authorities blamed Gazprom in the pipeline 
explosion, whereas Russia refused to take responsibility over the accident.
175
 As a result of the 
accident, gas supplies from Turkmenistan to Russia were stopped, and did not resume even 
after the pipeline was restored, because the countries could not agree on export volumes
176
. 
Tensions between Russia and Turkmenistan in 2009 could have pushed Ashgabat to establish 
closer ties with Europe, but this didn't happen.
177
 A new agreement on cooperation in energy 
and engineering between Turkmenistan and Russia was signed on December 23rd, 2009. 
Restoration of gas supplies started in January 2010, and the purchasing prices were consistent 
to the „European‟ pricing.  The agreement obligated Turkmenistan to supply only 30 bcm of 
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its gas to Russia, which is far below the amounts of gas supplied in previous years.
178
 
The decision to increase purchasing prices was taken not only towards Turkmenistan; 
same agreements were signed with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, too. In March 2008, 
negotiations between Gazprom, KazMunaiGas, Turkmengaz and Uzbekneftegaz were held, 
and the new „European‟ pricing formula for Central Asian gas was discussed. Later that same 
year all relevant documents were signed. The prices were increased substantially, from about 
$140-160 per thousand cubic meters in 2008 to the average $340 in 2009
179
. 
For a long time, Russia resold cheap Central Asian gas to Europe at higher prices, 
receiving considerable profits at the expense of transit. Because of the increased prices, 
Russia's gas profits reduced significantly, but this policy serves long-term interests of 
Moscow.
180
 Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan would have had more reasons to cell 
their gas to China, Iran or EU if they offered higher prices than Russia. 
This policy hinders the Central Asian countries‟ participation in projects supported by 
Europe. For Central Asian countries, it is now more advantageous to cell their gas to Russia 
than to build a new pipeline beneath the Caspian Sea. It is most likely that Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan will agree on expansion of the capacity of the CAC pipeline 
system without risking their partnership with Russia. Respectively, it will be more difficult to 
the EU to propose more favorable conditions for these countries to persuade them to 
participate in TCGP and Nabucco projects.
181
 
However, Russia failed to prevent the appearance of China and Iran in Central Asian 
energy sector. Iran plans to increase volumes of Turkmen gas from 8 bcm to 20 bcm
182
, China 
went even further. In December 2009, 40 bcm/year capacity pipeline was opened to supply 
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Turkmen gas through territory of Kazakhstan to China.
183
 The pipeline construction not only 
shutters Russia‟s status of main purchaser of Central Asian gas, but also hinders the 
possibility that the Caspian region will have enough gas to supply to the European Union. 
The decision on pipeline construction was taken by Niyazov in 2006. According to the 
initial agreement, Turkmenistan committed to supply 30 bcm of Turkmen gas to China for 30 
years.  Later, it was decided to increase pipeline capacity to 40 bcm/year. Additional gas can 
be supplied to China from Kazakh gas field Karachaganak, and this mark the first opportunity 
for Kazakhstan to sell its gas to non-Russian customer. Agreement on the pipeline 
construction was signed in 2007, and on December, 2009 the 7,000 km pipeline was already 
officially opened.
184
 
 
b) Estimate of probability of Caspian countries to participate in European projects on 
gas supplies 
At the present time, unlike other contenders for Caspian gas, the European Union has 
no means of transportation to supply gas from the Central Asia, besides those which go 
through Russian territory. As mentioned, the route to delivery Caspian gas to Europe consists 
of three pipelines (TCGP, BTE and Nabucco), two of which are not built yet. Participation of 
no Caspian region country was confirmed by signing of appropriate agreements. 
As a result of numerous discussions and negotiations it became clear, that participation 
of Kazakhstan in TCGP and Nabucco is not likely, at least in the nearest future. In February, 
2007 Kazakhstan discussed the terms of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline construction with 
European authorities and expressed its interest in the project. However, Kazakh authorities 
have underscored their coherence to Russia in their energy politics, and even proposed 
                                                 
183
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8411204.stm  
184
 Cutler (2010) 
63 
 
possibility of Russia joining the project.
 185
 In 2009, Kazakh Deputy Minister of Energy and 
Mineral Resources Aset Magauov said that participation of Kazakhstan in Nabucco is not 
likely because the country does not produce sufficient amounts of natural gas to be able to 
export it to Europe.
186
 This was confirmed by Kazakh Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev 
during his visit to Vienna in January, 2010. Saudabayev stated that Kazakhstan is not ready to 
participate in the project at this stage, but future accession is possible.  It will depend on the 
pace of gas field development, and also on economic feasibility of Kazakhstan‟s participation, 
he said.
187
 
As for Uzbekistan, this country was also expected to supply its gas to Europe via 
TCGP and Nabucco. In 2009, President of Bulgaria Georgi Parvanov attempted to negotiate 
with Uzbek authorities the possibility of transportation of Uzbek gas to Europe. Islam 
Karimov, president of Uzbekistan, refused to participate in Nabucco, saying that this country 
will supply natural gas only to Russia or through territory of Russia
188
. This was confirmed 
with the consent of Uzbekistan to increase capacity of Central Asia – Center pipeline in 
September, 2008. Construction of a new pipeline parallel to the existing Central Asia – Center 
could enable increase of annual gas supplies from Central Asia to Russia to 80-84 bcm per 
year.
189
 
Of all Caspian littoral states, participation of Azerbaijan in Nabucco is the most likely. 
Azerbaijan‟s obligations to sell gas to Russia will not affect possibility of gas supplies to 
Europe. By the time the first phase of Nabucco is complete, an agreement on gas supplies to 
Russia will be expired. Moreover, the amount of gas supplied from Azerbaijan to Russia is too 
little to hinder gas supplies to the European Union. On 6th May, 2010 Chief of public policy 
department of presidential administration of Azerbaijan Ali Hasanov confirmed readiness of 
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Azerbaijan to participate in the project
190
. On 13th Eurasian Economic Summit in Istanbul 
Hasanov stated that Azerbaijan will supply 50 percent of the country‟s natural gas to 
Nabucco.
191
 The deal between Turkey and Azerbaijan which will serve a background to the 
flow of Azeri gas to Europe via Nabucco is expected to be signed in June, 2010. 
192
 As 
assured by Azerbaijani authorities, this country will be able to supply up to 8 bcm of natural 
gas via Nabucco, later the amounts of gas could reach 12 bcm
193
. 
The only drawback here is that the export potential of the country is relatively low: in 
2008 net export capacity of Azerbaijan was equaled to 5.4 bcm (BP). The delay in gas-rich 
Shakh-Deniz 2 field development until 2016-2017
194
 can result in slower production growth 
of the country. Consequently Europe will receive small amounts of gas from Azerbaijan, 
which surely will not be enough to fill Nabucco. 
The European Union counts on gas supplies from Turkmenistan to fill Nabucco 
pipeline, but there is no confidence in participation of this country in the project. 
Berdimuhammedov‟s policy towards Nabucco is quiet ambiguous: he repeatedly expressed 
his desire to participate in the project, but there is still no progress on this direction. For 
instance, on July, 2009 in a speech to the Government Berdimuhammedov stated: "Currently, 
Turkmenistan has excess gas for trade. We are ready to send it abroad to any customer. This 
includes Nabucco."
195
 The contract on Turkmenistan‟s participation in the Nabucco project 
should have been signed in April, 2010, but this did not happen. Signing the agreement was 
postponed to the end of 2010.
196
 
In fact, Turkmenistan produces average but not really huge amounts of natural gas. 
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Nevertheless, the country‟s leader gives promises to supply its gas to all interested parties. 
Berdimuhammedov has signed long-term contract on gas supplies according to which 
Turkmenistan should annually sell 30 bcm of gas to China. Also, he promised to increase 
capacity of Turkemnistan-Iran pipeline to 20 bcm/year
197
. According to 2010 agreements, 
Turkmenistan should sell 30 bcm of its gas to Russia, 40 to China and 14 to Iran
198
. It should 
be recalled that for example in 2008 Turkmenistan produced only 66.1 bcm of natural gas, 19 
of which were spent on country‟s domestic needs. 199  Therefore, at issue are even those 
obligations which are committed by Berdimuhammedov this year.  
Even if all Central Asian countries or at least Turkmenistan agrees to TCGP 
construction, there are some obstacles to the project implementation. First, the obstacles that 
contributed to abolishment of the project ten years ago have not been yet overcome. No 
agreement on Caspian Sea delimitation was achieved, Iran and Russia can still opposed the 
pipeline construction. Relations between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have improved, but the 
dispute over Kyapaz/Serdar field has not been resolved yet
200
.  
 
6.4. Case Study: TCGP, Nabucco and their impact to the EU energy 
diversification 
To assess the impact of Caspian gas supplies to the EU energy diversification, a share 
of European energy needs that could be satisfied with the supplies from the Caspian region 
should be determined. This assessment must take into account the probability of participation 
of various Caspian countries in Nabucco and TCGP projects.  
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Table 3: Analysis of pipeline route from Caspian Region to Europe 
In case of the Nabucco project implementation, 31 bcm per year of gas will be 
annually supplied to Europe. According to IEA estimations, by 2015 EU-27 primary demand 
in natural gas would reach 606 bcm in 2015, and 681 bcm in 2030.
201
 Gas production in the 
European Union is expected to decrease to some 170 bcm in 2015 and 99 bcm in 2030.
202
 
This means, that by 2015 Nabucco will be able to satisfy 7.1% of EU net import demand for 
natural gas, and by 2030 - 5.3%. To compare, in 2007 Russia supplied 191 bcm of natural gas 
to Europe
203
, satisfying 65% of EU‟s net import demand. Accordingly, it is not likely that 
Nabucco realization will be of paramount importance for European energy security, and it will 
reduce European dependence on Russian gas supplies only slightly. The project can rather be 
assessed as one of the components of EU attempts to diversify its energy suppliers. 
Another issue is that none potential supplier has signed agreements confirming their 
participation in Nabucco. According to plan, Cenral Asian gas should be supplied via Trans-
Caspian Gas Pipeline to Azerbaijan, but the pipeline construction have not started. 
Furthermore, one of the three Central Asian gas producers Uzbekistan has refused 
participation in the project, Kazakhstan refused its participation „at this stage“. Relations 
between two countries participation of which in the project is most likely are quiet restrained, 
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and two other Caspian littoral countries Iran and Russia can oppose the pipeline construcion. 
All this casts doubt on TCGP implementation. 
The overall length of the route which is supposed to deliver Caspian gas is quiet long 
(about 4,892 km) and expensive (approximate cost – about $15.6 billion), while the capacity 
of the pipeline is relatively small (from 8 to 31 bcm, depending on whether SCP capasity is 
extended). The route passes through territories of many countries: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria. At this stage, only the 
European countries and transit Turkey have agreed to participate in the project.  
To date, from all Caspian littoral states participation of Azerbaijan as gas supplier to 
the EU is the most possible. But this country‟s production levels are yet relatively low, and it 
is most likely that Azerbaijan will supply about 8 bcm of its gas to Europe by the time the first 
stage of Nabucco is complete. In this case, only 1.8% of EU-27 2015 net import needs will be 
satisfied with Caspian gas supplies.  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
This section represents an overview of the explored materials and the research 
objectives. To come to a resolution of the research question, it is necessary to summarize the 
findings of the analytical part of the study. On the basis of the analysis of the findings, 
conclusions will be drawn. 
The overall aim of the research was to advance an understanding of the impact of 
Caspian gas to European energy security. The specific research objectives were to:  
1. analyze European energy market and dynamics of its growing dependency on 
Russian gas supplies, 
2. identify the motives behind Europe‟s effort to seek alternative gas supplier, 
3. identify mechanisms of the EU aimed at gaining access to Caspian energy, 
4. make an overview and compare energy export abilities of Russia and other Caspian 
region countries, 
5. estimate the possibilities of participation of Caspian countries in the pipeline 
projects which aim to supply Caspian energy to Europe bypassing Russia, 
and 
6. determine the contribution of Caspian gas supplies to the EU energy diversification. 
A summary of the findings to each of the research objectives will help to offer relevant 
conclusions to the research.  
Research objective 1: European energy market and dynamics of its growing 
dependency on Russian gas supplies 
Being the second largest energy consumer in the world, the European Union possesses 
relatively small reserves of oil and natural gas. The dependence of the European Union on 
external energy suppliers is growing, because of growing consumption of oil and gas and 
depletion of indigenous hydrocarbon reserves.  According to predictions, by 2030 70% of 
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natural gas and of oil 90% will be supplied to the EU by external suppliers. Russia is a major 
natural gas supplier to the EU, and the dependence of EU on Russian gas supplies can reach 
50% in the future. 
Research objective 2: The motives behind Europe’s effort to seek alternative gas 
suppliers 
Rapid growth in natural gas consumption, rising prices on fossil fuels and prospect of 
future overdependence on single gas supplier may have a negative impact for European 
energy security. The 2006 and 2009 gas crises undermined confidence of the European Union 
in stable gas supplies from Russia, and demonstrated vulnerability of Europe in energy issues. 
The European Commission strategies offer variety of measures to strengthen energy security 
of the EU, most important of which are diversification of energy suppliers and energy-mix. 
Dependence on external suppliers will keep on growing in the foreseeable future, as it will 
take a long time before Europe's energy mix will be dominated with alternative sources of 
energy. Consequently, diversification of energy suppliers is seen as the most viable option to 
strengthen European energy security in the medium term.   
Research objective 3: Mechanisms of the EU aimed at gaining access to Caspian 
energy 
Europe sees the Caspian region as one of the alternatives to diversify supplies of oil 
and natural gas, and lower energy dependence on Russia and the Middle East. Since the 
collapse of Soviet Union, the European Union was particularly interested in hydrocarbon 
reserves of the four post-Soviet republics of the Caspian region: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. First efforts of the EU to gain access to Caspian energy 
represented the introduction of European companies in the exploration and production of oil 
and gas fields of the region. Since the post-Soviet republics had no financial resources for oil 
and gas field development, the European Union started providing investment to the energy 
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sector of the new independent states of the Caspian region.  
Since Caspian countries started to demonstrate rapid growth in oil and gas production, 
creation of transport corridors for the delivery of Caspian oil and gas to Europe became a 
priority. The EU succeeded to create transportation networks to supply Caspian oil to Western 
markets, while most of Caspian gas is supplied to Europe through Russian territory. As 
Europe seeks to reduce its dependence on Russian supplies, creation of pipeline network that 
would connect Caspian gas fields with European markets is a priority for the EU. Number of 
European politicians and scholars adhere to the view that gas supplies from the Caspian 
region would undermine Russian dominance in European energy market, and insure European 
energy security, while other doubt that this idea can be implemented.  
Research objective 4:  Overview and comparison of energy export abilities of 
Russia and other Caspian region countries (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan) 
In order to determine whether Caspian region countries can compete with Russia 
and/or undermine Russia‟s role of major energy supplier to the European Union, comparison 
of gas production levels and export abilities is applied. The analysis showed that export 
abilities of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan taken together are far 
below the net export potential of Russia. Consequently, even if the four Caspian countries 
supply all of the gas they produce excluding the amount of the gas they consume, they would 
not be able to beat Russian gas supplies.  
Case study analysis of gas supplies from the Caspian region to external market in 2007 
showed that Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan supplied substantial 
amounts of their gas to external markets, and that the amounts of gas that could be potentially 
supplied to additional energy consumer were very small that year. Taking into account that 
Caspian region countries signed long-term contracts on gas supplies, it is not likely that they 
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will have more gas available for export to additional customers. 
Research objective 5: Possibilities of participation of Caspian countries in the 
pipeline projects which aim to supply Caspian energy to Europe bypassing Russia 
The transportation route that could delivery Caspian gas to Europe bypassing Russia 
consists of three pipelines: Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline, South Caucasus Pipeline and 
Nabucco. In order to define the contribution of Caspian countries to European energy security, 
capacities of the pipelines were examined, obstacles to the pipelines implementation were 
assessed, and possibilities of participation of Caspian region countries in TCGP and Nabucco 
were estimated. 
To supply Caspian gas to Europe, two pipelines should be constructed (TCGP and 
Nabucco), and the capacity of South Caucasus pipeline should be extended. In case if the 
route is constructed, Central Asian gas would be supplied to Baku via the proposed 30 
bcm/year TCGP pipeline. Azerbaijan would supplement additional volumes of gas, and 31 
bcm of Caspian gas would flow to Europe. In this case, 7.1% of EU 2015 net import demand, 
and 5.3% of EU 2030 net import demand would be satisfied. This means that implementation 
of the route will slightly contribute to EU energy diversification, but will not free the EU from 
their dependence on Russian gas supplies. 
There are many obstacles to the TCGP pipeline implementation, and therefore 
contribution of Central Asian gas to Nabucco is questionable. Circumstances that prevented 
the pipeline construction in 1990s are still not overcome: the legal status of the Caspian Sea is 
still not unresolved, the relations between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are still uneasy, and 
Russia and Iran can still oppose the pipeline construction.  
The political discourse has shown, that Russia puts effors to prevent gas flows from 
the Caspian region via pipelines bypassing its territory. Besides that, Turkmenistan, the major 
gas producing country of the Caspian region is obligated to supply huge amounts of its gas to 
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China. Iran is also seeking to expand the capacity of Turkmenistan-Iran gas pipeline. Taking 
into account, that energy potential of Centrlal Asia can currently be estimated as average 
rather than high, it is doubtful that Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan will be able to 
supply their gas to via Europe via Nabucco. Statements of the authorities of these countries of 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also confirmed, that their participation in TCGP and Nabucco is 
not likely, at least in the foreseeable future. Whereas, position of Turkmenistan‟s president on 
the issue is changeable.  
It is likely that Azerbaijan will supply its gas to Europe via Nabucco, because the 
country already has pipeline, connecting the country with Turkey and it does not have to 
participate in TCGP. Also, it has no obligations to sell huge amounts of its gas elswhere. 
Statements made by Azerbaijani officials confirm the interest of the country in the project. 
The only advers circomstance is that despite the production levels of the country are growing, 
they are still not sufficient to fill 31 bcm capacity Nabucco. It is expected that on the first 
stage of Nabucco, the country will be able to supply 8 bcm of its gas. This means that 
Azerbaijan will be able to satisfy only 1.15% of overall EU 2015 energy demand, 1.8 of EU-
27 2015 net export needs. Taking into account that Azerbaijan is the only country of the 
Caspian region which is likely to supply its gas to the European Union it can be concluded, 
that  efforts to diversify European energy security by securing supplies from the Caspian 
Region will have minimal impact. 
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VIII. ABSTRACT 
Today, energy security is a thorny issue for the European Union: levels of energy 
consumption are growing rapidly, while indigenous reserves are diminishing. The European 
Union seeks to diversify its energy suppliers, because overdependence on single supplier can 
undermine its energy security. Russia, the major supplier of gas to the EU, has demonstrated 
itself as unreliable energy supplier as a result of 2006 and 2009 disruptions. 
The Caspian region is seen as one of the options of gas supply diversification, and 
therefore the EU is making efforts to create pipeline route to supply Caspian gas bypassing 
Russia. Some European politicians agree that creation of such pipeline route could help 
Europe to lower dependence its dependence on gas supplies from Russia, and enhence 
European energy security. According to plan, the route should consist of three pipelines: 
TCGP, South Caucasus pipeline and Nabucco.  
The present research aims to define, whether the idea of Caspian gas supplies to the 
EU could contribute to European energy security and EU energy diversification. Given the 
confusion between those who predict that successful implementation of TCGP and Nabucco 
projects would guarantee better energy security for Europe and those who has doubts that 
construction of an energy bridge over the Caspian Sea can ever come to reality, it is important 
to clarify drivers and barriers of this issue. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 
 
IX. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Secondary literature 
1. ABISHEV, Adel (2004): Kaspij: neft' I politika. Kazachstanskij Institut Svobodnoje 
Obshestvo, Astana 
2. AKINER, Shirin (2004): “Caspian intersections: contextual introduction” in: The 
Caspian: Politics, energy and security, Akiner, Sh. (ed.) RoutledgeCurzon, New York. 
pp. 3-14 
3. BELOPSKY, Andrei V. and TALWIN, Manik (2002) “Geopolitical Basins and Oil and 
Gas Reserves of the Greater Caspian Region”, in: Kalyuzhnova, Y., Jaffe, A.M., Lynch 
D. and Sickles R.C. (eds.) Energy in the Caspian Region, Palgrave Macmillian, 
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, pp. 13-33  
4. BORISOVA, E.A. (2004): “Kazachstan v sisteme mezhdunarodnych svjazej” in: 
Central'naja Azija v sisteme meždunarodnych otnošenij: sbornik naučnych statej / 
Chamidov Zh (et al.), Institut vostokovedenija RAN, Moscow. pp. 151-173 
5. CORNELL, Svante (2007): "Trans-Caspian Pipelines and Europe's Energy Security" 
in: The Nabucco Pipeline: Reemerging Momentum in Europe‟s Front Yard, Cornell, S. 
and Nilsson, N. (eds.), Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 
Washington pp. 141-154 
6. CORNELL, Svante and NILSSON, Niklas (2008): The Nabucco Pipeline: 
Reemerging Momentum in Europe‟s Front Yard. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & 
Silk Road Studies Program, Washington 
7. EHTESHAMI, Anoushiravan (2004): “Geopolitics of hydrocarbons in Central and 
Western Asia” in: The Caspian: Politics, energy and security, Akiner, Sh. (ed.) 
RoutledgeCurzon, New York. pp. 63-76 
8. GRANMAYEH, Ali (2004): “Legal history of the Caspian Sea” in: The Caspian: 
Politics, energy and security, Akiner, Sh. (eds.) RoutledgeCurzon, New York. pp. 17-
47 
9. RABALLAND, Gael and GENTE, Regis (2008): “Oil in the Caspian Basin: facts and 
figures”, in: Najman, B., Pomfret, R., Raballand G. (eds.) The economics and politics 
of oil in the Caspian Basin: the redistribution of oil revenues in Azerbaijan and Central 
Asia. Routledge, New York. pp. 9-29 
10. ROBERS, John (2004): “Pipeline politics” in: The Caspian: Politics, energy and 
security, Akiner, Sh. (ed.) RoutledgeCurzon, New York. pp. 77-89 
11. SALYGIN V.I., SAFARJAN A.V. (2005): Sovremennye mezhdunarodnye otnoshenija 
v Kaspijskom regione. MGIMO-Universitet, Moscow 
12. SOLIGO, Ronald and JAFFE, Amy Myers (2001): “The Economics of Pipeline 
Routes: The Conundrum of Oil Exports from the Caspian Basin” in: Energy in the 
Caspian Region: Present and Future / Kalyuzhnova  pp. 109-132 
 
75 
 
Internet articles 
13. AMINEH, Mehdi (2004): “Caspian Energy: A viable alternative to the Persian Gulf?” 
EurAsia Bulletin, Vol. 8 No. 3-4, on March-April, 2004 
<http://www.eias.org/publications/bulletin/2004/marapr04/ebmarapr04p6.pdf> 
(03.03.2010) 
14. BAHGAT, G. (2009) “Europe‟s Energy Security: Challenges and Opportunities” in: 
Bradley A. Thayer and Nuray Ibryamova (eds.): Debates in International Relations. 
Pearson Longman Publishers, London 
<http://www.cuimpb.es/uploads/ponencias/386Sessio_VI.pdf> (12.02.2010) 
15. BARAN, Zeyno (2007): “EU Energy Security: Time to End Russian leverage” The 
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 30, on September 2007, pp. 131 - 144 
<http://www.twq.com/07autumn/docs/07autumn_baran.pdf> (12.02.2010) 
16. BELKIN, Paul (2008): “The European Union‟s Energy Security Challenges” CRS 
Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, on January, 30 
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33636.pdf>  (20.05.2010) 
17. BLANK, Stephen (2009): Germany and Turkey keep Nabucco on the rocks“ Central 
Asia – Caucasus Institut Analyst, on March 25th 
<http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5070> (15.04.2010) 
18. BOCHKAREV, Danila (2009): “European” Gas Prices: Implications Of Gazprom‟s 
Strategic Engagement With Central Asia, Pipeline & Gas Journal, East West Institute, 
Vol. 236, No. 6, on: June <http://pipelineandgasjournal.com/“european”-gas-prices-
implications-gazprom‟s-strategic-engagement-central-asia?page=3> (20.05.2010) 
19. CRISIS GROUP (2007): Central Asia‟s Energy Risks, Asia Report N°133, on 24 May 
2007 <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/central-
asia/133_central_asia_s_energy_risks.ashx> (01.03.2010) 
20. CUTLER, Robert (2010): “Turkmenistan-China Gas Pipeline Becomes a Reality” 
Central Asia – Caucasus Analyst 12, No. 2 on February 3rd, pp 4–6. 
<http://www.robertcutler.org/blog/2010/02/turkmenistanchina_gas_pipeline.html> 
21. DENISON, Michael (2009): “The EU and Central Asia Commercialising the Energy 
Relationship” EUCAM Working Paper No. 2, on July 2009 
<http://www.fride.org/publication/637/the-eu-and-central-asia:-commercialising-the-
energy-relationship> (18.03.2010) 
22. NORLING, Nicklas (2007): Gazprom‟s Monopoly and Nabucco‟s Potentials: Strategic 
Decisions for Europe. The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Washington 
<http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/Silkroadpapers/2007/0711Nabucco.pdf> 
23. OLCOTT, Marta Brill (2008): “Security for a New Century: Study Group Report”, 
The Henry L. Stimson Center  
<http://www.stimson.org/newcentury/pdf/02.01.08%20Martha%20Brill%20Olcott-
%20Central%20Asian%20Energy.pdf> (26.02.2010) 
24. PIRANI, Simon, STERN, Jonathan and YAFIMAVA, Katya (2009): “The Russo-
Ukrainian Gas Dispute of January 2009: A Comprehensive Assessment” 
<http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/NG27.pdf>  (27.03.2010) 
25. RZAYEVA G. (2010): „Gaz dlja Nabucco“ Informacionno-Analiticheskij Centr, on 
76 
 
February 10th  <http://www.ia-centr.ru/publications/7185/> 
26. SPANJER, A.R. (2007): “Russian gas price reform and the EU-Russia gas relationship: 
Incentives, consequences and European security of supply”, Energy Policy, 35(5), May, 
p. 2889-2898 <http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/as-2007-1.pdf> 
27. SOCOR, Vladimir (2009): “Azerbaijan-Russia Gas Agreement: Implications for 
Nabucco Project” Eurasia Daily Monitor ,Vol. 6, on October 15th   
<http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35615&tx_ttn
ews[backPid]=27&cHash=efe96da8f4> (14.05.2010) 
28. SOCOR, Vladimir (2006): “Azerbaijan spearheading initiative on Trans-Caspian Gas 
Pipeline” Eurasia Daily Monitor ,Vol. 3, on March 30 
<http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=31531> 
(14.04.2010) 
29. STERN, Jonathan (2002): Security of European Natural Gas Supplies: The impact of 
import dependence and liberalization. Royal Institute of International Affairs, London 
<http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/3035_sec_of_euro_gas_jul02.pdf> 
(27.03.2010) 
30. STERN, Jonathan (2006): “The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of January” Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies  <http://www.avim.org.tr/icerik/energy-gas.pdf> 
(27.03.2010) 
31. YENIKEYEFF , Shamil (2008): “Kazakhstan‟s Gas: Export Markets and Export 
Routes” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies 
<http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/NG25.pdf> (14.04.2010) 
Primary sources 
32. Andris Piebalgs Speech at the 7th Doha Natural Gas Conference, Doha, 11 March 
2009 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/09/102&format=
HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> (25.04.2010) 
33. EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan: 2nd Strategic Energy Review, 
Brussels, 13.11.2008 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/703&type=HT
ML> (4.04.2010) 
34. European Commission: “European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper” Brussels, 
12.05.2004 <http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf> 
(7.04.2010) 
35. European Commission Green Paper: “A European Strategy for Sustainable, 
Competitive and Secure Energy” Brussels, 03.08.2006 
<http://www.energy.eu/directives/2006_03_08_gp_document_en.pdf >(2.02.2010) 
36. European Commission Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, 
Competitive and Secure Energy, Brussels, 8.03.2006 http://eur-
<lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&ty
pe_doc=COMfinal&an_doc=2006&nu_doc=105> (30.03.2010) 
37. European Commission Green Paper: “Energy: Let Us Overcome Our Dependence”. 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2002 
<http://www.clubofamsterdam.nl/contentarticles/12%20energy/eu%20green%20paper.
pdf> (2.02.2010) 
77 
 
38. European Commission Staff  Working Document: "The January 2009 Gas Supply 
Disruption to the EU: an Assessment" Brussels, 2009 
<http://ec.europa.eu/danmark/documents/alle_emner/energi/2009_ser2_autre_docume
nt_travail_service_part1_ver2.pdf> (30.03.2010) 
39. INOGATE Umbrella Agreement, Kiev, 22.07.1999 
<http://www.inogate.org/inogate_programme/inogate_archives/inogate-umbrella-
agreement/UMBRELLA_AGREEMENT.pdf> (7.04.2010) 
40. The European Community Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for 
the period 2007-2013 
<http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/central_asia/rsp/07_13_en.pdf> (16.04.2010) 
 
Data sources 
41. BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009  
<http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and
_publications/statistical_energy_review_2008/STAGING/local_assets/2009_download
s/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2009.pdf> 
42. International Energy Agency 
<http://www.iea.org/subjectqueries/keyresult.asp?KEYWORD_ID=4103> 
43. U.S. Energy Information Administration Independent Statistics and Analysis 
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/> 
44. World Energy Outlook 2008, OECD/IEA, International Energy Agency, France 
 
Other sources 
 
45. ACTURCA  
http://acturca.wordpress.com/2006/05/08/ec-supports-trans-caspian-gas-pipeline/  
46. AllBusiness 
http://www.allbusiness.com/economy-economic-indicators/economic-conditions-
recovery/14106281-1.html  
47. Armenianow.com 
http://armenianow.com/commentary/analysis/23039/nabucco_construction  
48. AsiaNews.it 
http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Nabucco-or-South-Stream,-the-battle-over-energy-
transit-to-Europe-is-on-18371.html  
49. Asia Times Online http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/JG30Ag01.html  
50. Asian Development Outlook 2002 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan008426.pdf  
51. BAKU Initiative 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/international/regional/caspian/energy_en.htm  
52. BBC News  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7814743.stm 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8411204.stm  
53. British Petroleum 
http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9006670&contentId=701509
78 
 
5  
54. Central Asia – Caucasus Institute 
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5254  
55. CentrAsia.ru  
http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1189499220  
http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1242285720 
56. Europe‟s Energy Portal 
http://energy.eu/  
57. FOXEYARD 
http://www.forexyard.com/en/news/Turkish-Azeri-gas-deal-to-be-signed-June-7-
sources-2010-05-27T144716Z  
58. Gazprom 
http://old.gazprom.ru/articles/article25226.shtml  
http://eng.gazpromquestions.ru/?id=9  
http://old.gazprom.ru/articles/article27120.shtml  (13.03.2010) 
   http://old.gazprom.ru/articles/article18465.shtml  (13.03.2010) 
http://www.gazprom.ru/production/projects/pipelines/pg/  (14.05.2010) 
59. Global Issues  
http://www.globalissues.org/article/595/energy-security 
60. Guardian.co.uk  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/dec/27/russia.ukraine  
61. INOGATE 
http://www.inogate.org/inogate_programme/inogate_network  
http://www.mfa.gov.rs/ForeignInvest/Inogate_e.htm  
INOGATE Enhancement of environmental protection measures in the oil/gas industry 
of Central Asia (EPMOGI) 
http://www.inogate.org/inogate_programme/inogate_projects/ongoing-inogate-
projects/enhancement-environmental-protection-measures (7.04.2010) 
62. Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses 
http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/TheRussiaUkraineGasDispute_NDKundu_
130106  
63. International Energy Agency 
http://www.iea.org/subjectqueries/keyresult.asp?KEYWORD_ID=4103  
64. International Relations and Security Network (ISN) 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?lng=en&id=95931 
65. Jamestown Foundation 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=33464  
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36010&tx
_ttnews[backPid]=414&no_cache=1 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=32549  
66. Middle East Economic Survey  
http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/v51n11-5OD02.htm  
67. Nabucco gas pipeline  
http://www.nabucco-pipeline.com/press-public-news/q-a/q-a.html  (2.02.2010) 
79 
 
http://www.nabucco-pipeline.com/portal/page/portal/en/pipeline/timeline_steps  
(25.04.2010) 
68. NEUROPE  
http://www.neurope.eu/articles/Kazakhstan-only-part-of--the-solution-for-
Nabucco/98499.php  
http://www.neurope.eu/articles/89642.php  
http://www.neurope.eu/articles/100374.php 
Press Release: President Barroso and Commissioner Piebalgs welcome the signature 
of the Nabucco Intergovernmental Agreement (10.07.2010) 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1114&format=HTML
&aged=0&language=EN   
69. News.az 
http://www.news.az/articles/14987  
70. News.com  
http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-07-14-voa32-68804462.html 
71. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty  
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1068320.html  
http://www.rferl.org/content/Article/1093167.html 
http://www.rferl.org/content/EU_Piebalgs_Nabucco_Gas/1196397.html 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Kazakh_Official_Rejects_Nabucco_Project/1762742.htm
l 
http://www.rferl.org/content/TurkmenistanChina_Gas_Pipeline_To_Open/1903108.ht
ml  
http://www.rferl.org/content/Turkmen_Gas_Exports_To_Iran_A_Boon_For_Both_Co
untries/1921933.html  
72. Reuters 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLA2358920090710  
73. RIA NOVOSTI  
http://en.rian.ru/business/20070802/70212626.html  
74. South Stream  
http://south-stream.info/index.php?id=9  
www.south-stream.info  
75. The New York Times 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/02/world/europe/02russia.html?_r=1 
76. Trend News 
http://en.trend.az/capital/macro/1562673.html  
http://en.trend.az/capital/pengineering/1681628.html   
77. UPI.com  
http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-Wars/2009/04/13/Pipeline-explosion-
reveals-Turkmenistan-Gazprom-rift/UPI-16101239666679/  
78. Vestnik Kavkaza 
http://www.vestikavkaza.ru/news/ekonomika/gaz/13284.html  
79. World Energy Forum executive summary 
http://www.weforum.org/pdf/EnergyVisionSummary.pdf  
80 
 
80. Yedinaya Rossiya  
http://www.erpz.ru/news/103/ 
81. ZAWYA  
http://www.zawya.com/Story.cfm/sidv52n31-
3NC03/Turkmenistan%20To%20Take%20Serdar/Kyapaz%20Dispute%20To%20ICA/   
